RALEIGH LECTURE ON HISTORY

THE END OF THE ANGLO-NORMAN REALM

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HISTORY is easiest recalled as a series of noteworthy dates: 1066, 1215, 1789, 1914, and so on. 1204 belongs perhaps to a minor calendar. It was the year in which the Anglo-Norman realm, established by William the Conqueror, collapsed: the year of the loss of Normandy for the English, the conquest of Normandy for the French. Thirty years after the event a scribe entered a list of dates in the cartulary of the lepers' hospital of St. Giles at Pont-Audemer in Normandy.[1] He was writing, he stated, on the feast of St. Calixtus in the year 1234. Then he computed the passage of time from a series of events. In addition to the Incarnation these were in order: the conquest of Jerusalem by the Crusaders which he placed incorrectly in 1097, the loss of Jerusalem and the Holy Cross to Saladin in 1187, the Norman Conquest of England in 1066, the battle of Val-ès-Dunes of 1047, the battle of Tinchebrai of 1106, and the deaths of the Norman Henry I, the English archbishop Thomas Becket, the Angevins, Henry II, Richard and John, and the Capetians, Philip II and Louis VIII. By the side of the great events of Christendom he placed the stages in the establishment of the Norman duchy and the Anglo-Norman realm. He named the great martyr of the Anglo-Norman Church. He listed the rulers of the duchy, Norman, Angevin, and Capetian, indiscriminately except that he gave Philip his territorial style. He gave no hint of any enforced break in the succession in 1204. He made no mention of the loss or conquest of Normandy or of King John's attempt at recovery which ended at Bouvines ten years later. He envisaged only one single line of Norman rulers; for him

[1] Rouen, Bibliothèque Municipale, MS. Y 200, fol. 78.

King Philip's son was not Louis VIII, but Louis I.[1] It was as if the events of 1204 had not mattered.

That was a Norman view of history. It would be easy to attribute the omissions in this list of dates to embarrassment or simple forgetfulness. Nevertheless, it is odd that one who could remember Val-ès-Dunes did not recall Bouvines, and the contrast is all the odder in that he wrote at a house founded by the Beaumont Counts of Meulan, who suffered dispossession as a result of the débâcle of 1204, a house where other scribes were avid collectors of documents of Anglo-Norman and English history.[2] At all events his list of dates contained little hint of a great dynastic dispute and none at all of a prolonged Anglo-French conflict.

The events which he failed to describe were the subject of a great book by Sir Maurice Powicke—*The Loss of Normandy*.[3] To award praise to this would now be superfluous: still after sixty-two years it provides the base for all subsequent discussion. Yet Powicke published his book in 1913. He began work with the Boer War scarcely over and he completed it while the Balkan wars were fought. Inevitably, for all his subtle insight into the

[1] The text is as follows:

Anno ab Incarnatione domini m°cc° xxx° quarto factum fuit hoc scriptum in festo sancti Kalixti pape hoc modo:

Annus ab Incarnatione domini m^{us} cc^{us} xxx^{us} quartus
A conquisitione Jerusalem c^{us} xxx^{us} vij^{us}
A captivitate Jerusalem et raptu crucis per Salahadinum xlvij^{us}
A subjugatione Anglie per regem Willelmi c^{us} lx^{us} viij^{us}
A bello Vall' dunarum c^{us}lxxx^{us} vij^{us}
A bello Tenchebrai c^{us} xx^{us} octavus
A decessu regis Henrici primi xc^{us} ix^{us}
A martirio sancti Thomae lx^{us} quartus
A decessu regis Henrici secundi xl^{us} vj^{us}
A decessu regis Ricardi xxx^{us} vj^{us}
A decessu regis Johannis xviij^{us}
A decessu regis Philippi Francie xj^{us}
A decessu regis Ludovici primi ix^{us}

The scribe not only miscalculated the date of the capture of Jerusalem of 1099, but also erred in placing the deaths of Henry II and Richard I in 1188 and 1198 respectively. The remaining dates are correct. No known reckoning of the beginning of the year would allow him to place 6 July, when Henry II died, a year earlier than 14 July when Philip II died.

[2] J. C. Holt, 'A Vernacular-French Text of Magna Carta', *English Historical Review*, lxxxix (1974), 352–6.

[3] Manchester, 1913; 2nd edn., Manchester, 1961. All references below, except where noted, are taken from the second edition.

medieval mind, he wrote in an age of national and imperial conflicts and annexations. And in his book he envisaged a great international event, a clash of states. 'I wish to study the Norman state during the crisis which led to its union with France'.[1] That, his opening sentence, was matched by the conclusion: 'For the first time in the modern world one highly organised state had annexed another'. 'When the Normans became French they did a great deal more than bring their national epic to a close. They permitted the English once more to become a nation, and they established the French state for all time.'[2] French scholars likewise have seen the history of the Plantagenet lands as part of a national epic. Professor Boussard, for example, maintains that 'Henry II, despite appearances and scholastic interpretations which present him as an alien and an enemy, is really one of the architects of a unified France'.[3] Yet it is possible to tell the story in a plainer context of governmental and feudal relations. In 1204 the Normans were in many senses French; so indeed were the kings and nobles of England. Normandy and all the other continental possessions of the Plantagenet house, except Gascony, were fiefs held of the French Crown. In feudal terms the loss or conquest of these provinces amounted to the reversion of the lordship of the Duke of Normandy and Count of Anjou to his superior the King of France. In formal terms it executed a judgement in King Philip's court. Once complete the kings of France based their rights in those areas on those previously exercised by the Plantagenets. It was not annexation but supersession.[4] That may be why the change went unnoticed by the scribe of Pont-Audemer.

[1] Powicke, op. cit., p. 7.

[2] Ibid., pp. 306, 307.

[3] 'Henri II, malgré les apparences et les schémas scolaires qui font de lui un étranger et un ennemi, est en réalité l'un des artisans de l'unité française' (J. Boussard, 'L'Empire Plantagenêt' in F. Lot and R. Fawtier, *Histoire des institutions françaises au moyen âge*, i. 69). Cf. 'Pour une grande part la France de saint Louis et l'Angleterre d'Édouard I[er] sont le prolongement de l'œuvre d'Henri II' (*Le Gouvernement d'Henri II Plantagenêt*, Paris, 1956, p. 582).

[4] It is striking that among the large number of *querimonia* of 1247 only a very few adduced the ancient customs of Normandy *ante conquestum* against new impositions which had arisen under the Capetians. See *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, xxiv, pt. i, nos. 261, 262, 355, 369, 480, 504, 551. The point may be illustrated on a smaller scale: at Verneuil King John ordered the construction of a tanning mill which King Philip subsequently completed, both to the damage of a citizen of the town (ibid., no. 250).

Up to 1154 this realm was held together not only by the energy of its rulers, but also by the interest of the great Anglo-Norman families. They indeed had helped to build it. Some were contentious and rebellious, prone on occasion to exploit, even initiate, violence and anarchy. But when the kingdom was separated from the duchy in 1087 and 1100, and when the invasion of Geoffrey of Anjou detached Normandy from allegiance to Stephen after 1138, families with estates on both sides of the Channel on the whole sought to repair such a division of the realm. In 1153–4 they excluded Stephen's heirs from the succession and accepted Henry of Anjou. Fifty years later their descendants reacted very differently. There was no prolonged resistance or disturbance like that which marked the earlier divisions. In 1204 the Anglo-Norman realm simply fell apart. Soon the collapse was total and the defeat complete. Within ten years of the loss of Normandy English barons banded together to resist military service on the Continent. They opposed King John not in order to achieve the reunification of England and Normandy, but to resist all that followed from his own insistent ambition towards that end.

At one important point this contrast is inexact. The old Anglo-Norman realm was self-contained. There were outlying interests in Maine and Brittany, but it was nevertheless compact and by contemporary standards well governed. However, from 1154 it formed only a part of a larger dominion stretching south through the Angevin patrimony to the vast possessions acquired through Henry's marriage to Eleanor of Aquitaine. The old realm and the new dominion were distinct. No new tenurial bond was established like that which stretched across the Channel. Within the new dominion England and Normandy shared closer administrative ties than those which bound the rest. Nevertheless when the break came in 1204 the line of fracture was not between the old Norman and the newer Angevin lands but between Normandy, Anjou, and Brittany on the one hand, and England and Gascony on the other; Poitou for the moment remained debatable. Hence the break between England and Normandy was part of the collapse of the Plantagenet dominion and it is in the history and structure of that dominion that an explanation of the end of the Anglo-Norman realm must start.

The study of the government of the Plantagenet lands involves more than ordinary difficulties in selecting and interpreting the evidence. For Professor Boussard 'the Angevin Empire

was conceived as an extremely strong state within the structure of the feudal system'.[1] Professor Warren, in contrast, has maintained that 'Henry II conceived the future of the Angevin dominions not as an *empire* but as a *federation*'.[2] Somewhere between these two extremes Professor Le Patourel describes it both as a 'feudal empire' and a 'family assemblage' of lands.[3] The Angevin kings encouraged the development of strong centralized systems of government within provinces of their dominions, especially in Normandy and England. But that does not establish that they sought to impose a similar centralization on their dominions as a whole. True, there are examples of what may fairly be described as imperial acts. They are worth listing. The first probable example is provided by the Norman edict of 1159 which seems to follow an earlier English *constitutio* concerning the jurisdiction of the courts of deans and archdeacons.[4] A second is provided by the Norman inquest of 1171 which bore some similarity to the English Inquest of Sheriffs of 1170.[5] A third such act is an edict of 1177 concerning sureties for debt which, according to the *Gesta Henrici*, was directed to Normandy, Anjou, Aquitaine, and Brittany.[6] Thereafter there is the English Assize of Arms of 1181 which was preceded by similar measures on the Continent.[7] None of these acts survive in the original; some are known only from summaries or references by chroniclers.[8] The list may be supplemented by other less certain

[1] 'L'empire angevin était donc conçu comme un État très fort, mais dans le cadre du système féodale' (*Le Gouvernement d'Henri II Plantagenêt*, p. 569).

[2] *Henry II* (London, 1973), p. 561.

[3] 'The Plantagenet Dominions', *History*, l (1965), 299, 301, 302.

[4] C. H. Haskins, *Norman Institutions* (Harvard, 1918), pp. 329–33.

[5] Ibid., pp. 337–43; L. Delisle and E. Berger, *Recueil des actes de Henri II* (Paris, 1909–27), *Introduction*, pp. 345–7.

[6] *Gesta regis Henrici secundi Benedicti Abbatis*, ed. W. Stubbs (Rolls Series, 1867), i. 194.

[7] Ibid. i. 269–70. The text of the assize is conveniently accessible in W. Stubbs, *Select Charters*, 9th edn. (Oxford, 1921), pp. 183–4. For arguments that Howden misdated this assize and that it could be attributed more reasonably to 1176 see H. G. Richardson and G. O. Sayles, *The Governance of Medieval England* (Edinburgh, 1963), p. 439 n., and their *Law and Legislation from Aethelberht to Magna Carta* (Edinburgh, 1966), pp. 99–100. Compare J. C. Holt, 'The Assizes of Henry II: the Texts', in *The Study of Medieval Records*, ed. D. A. Bullough and R. L. Storey (Oxford, 1971), pp. 90–1.

[8] For an attempt to exploit another source by tracing 'legislation' underlying the earliest Norman custumal see J. Yver, 'Le "Très Ancien Coutumier" de Normandie, miroir de la législation ducale?', *Revue d'Histoire du Droit*, xxxix (1971), 333–74. This does not add to the 'imperial acts'.

examples. The assize of Count Geoffrey, establishing primogeniture in Brittany, may be based on a *constitutio* of Normandy attributable to Henry II.[1] It is possible that the English eyre of 1194 was accompanied by a similar measure in Normandy,[2] and there were common measures imposed by common extraneous needs, like the Saladin tithe and King Richard's ransom.[3] But even when extended thus the list is not long. It looks even less long if set against the measures imposed on England, for example, which were *not* extended to other parts of the Empire. It almost disappears if those measures shared by the old Anglo-Norman realm are excluded. The edict of 1177 and perhaps the Assize of Arms alone remain. The case may be supported by vaguer evidence. Powicke, for example, argued that Henry II introduced tenure in *parage* from Anjou into Normandy and that he exercised a strong influence throughout his lands in favour of impartibility in the inheritance of feudal estates. But this is not entirely convincing.[4]

[1] The Norman *constitutio* is in the *Très Ancien Coutumier*, cap. viii, *Coutumiers de Normandie*, ed. E. J. Tardif (Société de l'histoire de Normandie, 1881), i. 8–9. For Count Geoffrey's assize see G. Planiol, 'L'Assise au Comte Geffroi', *Nouvelle Revue historique de droit*, xi (1887), 117–62, 652–708, and for a better presentation of the text his *La Très Ancienne Coutume de Bretagne* (Rennes, 1896), pp. 319–23. Planiol attributed the Assize to Anglo-Norman influences ('L'Assise', p. 135) and this has been followed by others. See R. Génestal, *Le Parage normand* (Bibliothèque d'histoire du droit normand, 2nd ser., études i, fasc. 2, Caen, 1911), 1–2; F. M. Powicke, 'The Angevin Administration of Normandy', *English Historical Review*, xxii (1907), 38; J. Yver, 'Les Caractères Originaux du Groupe de Coutumes de l'Ouest de la France', *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, 4th ser., xxx (1952), 46 n. 2; and J. Boussard, op. cit., p. 571. However, there is no certainty about the attribution of the *constitutio* to Henry. Moreover the Assize of Count Geoffrey reveals no trace of any direct intervention on his part. It was granted *petitioni episcoporum et baronum omnium Britanniae satisfaciens . . . communi assensu eorum*, and was sealed with the seals of Geoffrey and his wife Constance. Cap. 4, which establishes primogeniture among heiresses, is inconsistent with any English precedent.

[2] F. M. Powicke, *The Loss of Normandy*, pp. 52 n., 77.

[3] For the effect of such demands on Normandy see L. Delisle, 'Des Revenus Publics en Normandie', *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, 3rd ser., iii (1852), 119–31, and F. M. Powicke, op. cit., p. 233.

[4] F. M. Powicke, 'The Angevin Administration of Normandy', *English Historical Review*, xxii (1907), 38; *The Loss of Normandy*, pp. 34 n., 50–1. Powicke relied in the main here on Guilhiermoz, *Essai sur l'origine de la noblesse en France au moyen âge* (Paris, 1902), pp. 203–51, 214, but it now seems certain that this form of tenure in Normandy emerged well before the reign of Henry II. See J. C. Holt, 'Politics and Property in Early Medieval England', *Past and Present*, lvii (1972), 44–5.

However, if the extent of 'imperial legislation' was negligible, that was very far from true of the activities of the king and his itinerant court, of his great officials, supporters and advisers: clerks, *magistri*, literate laymen, and magnates lay and ecclesiastical, who dealt with matters arising throughout the Plantagenet dominions. This 'top tier' of government, as Professor Le Patourel describes it,[1] gave central direction to the management of the 'empire', and it would be hard to exaggerate the amount of work which the Angevin kings and the men around them achieved. Nevertheless, it calls for some cautionary comment. First, the circle in and around the *curia* was made up of men who might be called upon to serve the king in important office now in one province, now in another. They were all interested in secular office and ecclesiastical preferment, in matters in which the king's rule seemed truly imperial. Regularly they experienced manifestations of the extent of Plantagenet government, assisting with business from, or executing mandates for, the most far-flung of the king's dominions. Two such men, 'Glanville' and Richard Fitz Neal, wrote commentaries on their own sectors of government. Others in, or on the fringes of, the court, Peter of Blois, Walter Map, and Gerald of Wales, wrote in a more gossipy style about its life and work. It was perhaps inevitable that even the more professional of them resorted to adulatory exaggeration:

> For although this king (Henry II) was 'sprung from ancient kings' and extended his empire far and wide by his triumphs, it is his even greater glory that his actions exceeded his extravagant reputation.[2]

These men were commenting on government from within, from a standpoint which could only exaggerate the control, the capacity to devise and enforce policy, which the Plantagenet kings and the men around them exercised.

Secondly, there were practical limits to what an itinerant king could do. Henry II, Richard, and for a time, John, had to cover far more ground than their Norman predecessors, and this without any technical improvement in the means of transport. It is a commonplace of English history that Richard I was an absentee and that Henry II spent long periods away from his kingdom. But the same may be said of any one of the Plantagenet domains. Henry II spent roughly 13 years in England,

[1] 'The Plantagenet Dominions', p. 298.

[2] *Dialogus de Scaccario*, ed. Charles Johnson (London, 1950), pp. 27–8.

only a little more, roughly 14½ years in total, in Normandy, and far less, only 7 years in total, in Anjou/Touraine and Aquitaine.[1] If he was an absentee in England he was an absentee everywhere. It is customary to commend the Angevin kings for their hard travelling. But it is well to question what travelling involved, whether indeed a horse was the most effective seat of regular orderly government. 'He was always on the move', wrote Walter Map of Henry II, 'travelling in unbelievably long stages, like a post, and in this respect merciless beyond measure to the household that accompanied him'.[2] Peter of Blois also painted a picture of uncertain starts and unscheduled stops, a court moving at the whim of a man who apparently delighted in creating uncertainty.[3] Much of the quality of Angevin government could be summed up in the single word 'restless'. One of these kings received his death wound in the saddle, the other two died from illness brought on or exacerbated by travel. None of them could afford repose.

Thirdly, the view that such an itinerant monarch positively directed the affairs of his widespread dominions does not square entirely with the surviving acts of government. At first sight the work of the Chancellor and the clerks of the writing office suggests that they were the hub around which the wheel of state revolved. But this impression is faulty. Much of the documentary material which survives arose from the initiative of subjects. Many royal acts make it perfectly clear that they are drawn up at the request of the beneficiary or some other party. Some were prepared when the beneficiary or a friend or agent was at court. Still under Henry II some were drafted by the beneficiary.[4] Just occasionally a letter requesting a royal confirmation still survives, an occasional example of what must have formed an extensive class of correspondence.[5] Frequently too, a royal act simply marked a stage in prolonged litigation or

[1] See Doris M. Stenton in *Cambridge Medieval History*, v. 554, and J. Le Patourel 'The Plantagenet Dominions', p. 295. As Professor Le Patourel notes, these figures provide only a rough guide. R. W. Eyton, *The Court, Household and Itinerary of Henry II* (London, 1878), on which the calculations are based, is far from reliable, especially in its use of information drawn from the Pipe Rolls.

[2] *De Nugis Curialum*, trans. M. R. James, ed. E. S. Harland (Cymmrodorion Record Series, ix, 1923), p. 261.

[3] J. P. Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, ccvii. 48–9.

[4] T. A. M. Bishop, *Scriptores Regis* (Oxford, 1961), pp. 9–10.

[5] *Actes de Henri II*, no. DLIII.

negotiation between parties.[1] All this is quite apart from routine operations of the courts which necessarily reflected the requirements of litigants. Hence, at any one point in time, the actions of the king seem random. In February or March 1158, for example, Henry II lay at Brockenhurst in the New Forest. At least five *acta* survive from that period. Two concern English monasteries—Plympton and Lenton priories;[2] one sought to ensure the return of escaped serfs to the Norman abbey of Jumièges;[3] two concerned the privileges of the monastery of S. Florent-Lès-Saumur in Anjou and arose from actions settled in Henry's court before Jocelin of Tours, seneschal of Anjou.[4] Such day-to-day activity, attending to widely scattered, unconnected business, made up a great deal of the king's contribution to the government of the Plantagenet lands.[5] It might embody policy and political attitudes, but it was not itself a policy or even a programme of work. It was simply a response to demand; the provision of protection, assurance, and confirmation, by an ultimate feudal superior. Procedure in these matters was primitive and near chaotic. The petitioner might suffer interminable delay before gaining satisfaction: the king, on the other hand, was pestered:

> Now the aforesaid King Henry II was distinguished by many good traits and blemished by some few faults. . . . He is wasteful of time over the affairs of his people, and so it comes about that many die before they get their matters settled, or leave the court depressed and penniless, driven by hunger. . . . Whatever way he goes out he is seized upon by the crowds and pulled hither and thither, pushed whither he would not, and, surprising to say, listens to each man with patience, and

[1] See in particular ibid., nos. CCXXVI, CCLX (confirming CCXXIV), CCLXXV, CCLXXXIII, DIII, all concerned with the privileges of Angevin monasteries. Compare no. CC, an act of Stephen de Marçay, seneschal of Anjou.

[2] *Monasticon Anglicanum*, v. 112; vi, pt. i, 53–4.

[3] *Actes de Henri II*, no. XCII.

[4] Ibid., nos. XC, XCI.

[5] Henry II's charters rarely carry a time-date. The fact that Richard I's are dated makes it possible in his case to illustrate a similar wide scatter of attention within the confines of a single day. On 12 November 1189 charters or letters were dated for the monks of Christ Church, Canterbury, the cathedral church of Rouen, the hospital of St. Mary Magdalen, Rouen, the cathedral church of Lichfield, the Bishop of Agen in Aquitaine, the monasteries of Cirencester and Bury St. Edmund and the citizens of Bedford and Worcester (L. Landon, *Itinerary of Richard I*, Pipe Roll Society, new ser., xiii. 14–15).

though assaulted by all with shouts and pullings and rough pushings, does not challenge anyone for it, nor show any appearance of anger, and when he is hustled beyond bearing silently retreats to some place of quiet.

That picture of Walter Map's is one of a badly overworked monarch.[1]

Of course this is not the whole story. There were important sessions of magnates and advisers, who gave their counsel, meetings where, on occasion, 'great acts of state' were decided and promulgated. More important still, there was the regular and continuing work of government in each of the Plantagenet lands: the enforcement of law, the provision of justice, the collection of revenue, the management of the demesne, the upkeep of castles, the maintenance of the royal forest. At this point surviving royal *acta* are themselves misleading, for charters sought as a warrant for privilege have survived far better than the much more numerous writs concerned with the donkey work of day-to-day government. If therefore it were possible to study all the letters issuing from the writing office over a period of a few months, it is very likely that the government's activities would look much more methodical than the surviving *acta* indicate. The English and Norman Pipe Rolls bear witness to these administrative ephemera in the very large number of *brevia regis* which were vouched as authority during the annual audit. But these present their own problems, for they can be set in three quite different contexts. Either they were issued while the king was in the country concerned; in that case the itinerant household overlapped provincial government, the one reinforcing the other. Alternatively, the writs were issued in the absence of the king on the authority of a deputed royal seal; this was done in the English Exchequer. Or again, writs might be issued at long range, appearing in England, for example, as *brevia de ultra mare*; this was appropriate for special instructions, but would have been inordinately inefficient for routine matters. Under King John, in the years after 1204, the system became compact and efficient, even inventive; by then the itinerant household was largely confined to one single province, the realm of England. But this was not so earlier. Henry II and Richard were faced with a harsh choice between delegation and inefficiency. Centralization of routine government was impossible. They could but try to hold delegated authority

[1] *De Nugis Curialium*, p. 265.

together by supervision from afar and personal visitation. These were to prove inadequate.

The Pipe Rolls of the English Exchequer are the only source to provide a continuous record of the relations between the king and the government of one of his dominions. They reveal that there were close links between the Exchequer and the household, that the work and personnel might overlap when the king was in the realm. But they also demonstrate that the Exchequer was already perfectly capable of functioning almost on its own during the long periods of royal absence, for example from 1158 to 1163 and 1166 to 1170. It did so on the authority of royal writs sealed with the Exchequer seal or on the authority of the Justiciar's writ under his personal seal.[1] Occasionally the king intervened; the Justiciar acted on the warrant of a royal writ *de ultra mare*, or a royal pardon was produced by a debtor, or payment was directed to the king's chamber, or a royal writ ordered a delay in account, or special protection was provided for a litigant. But in the absence of the king the Exchequer was an authoritative and effective organ of government. The king might initiate the Assize of Clarendon but the justices and barons of the Exchequer executed and developed it in the years after 1166. The king could descend on England and provide for the overhaul of local government in the Inquest of Sheriffs, but he departed within a few months and left the Justiciar and Exchequer to get on with it. In 1173 he was content to leave the Justiciar to contend with the rebellion of the earls and the resulting fortification, provisioning, and garrisoning of castles and the muster of troops for dispatch to the Continent. Sometimes the king's intervention was occasional and casual, a brief

[1] The rules governing the use of the Exchequer seal are described by Richard fitz Neal. See *Dialogus*, pp. 16, 19, 33, 62. The question is discussed by H. G. Richardson, *Memoranda Roll I John* (Pipe Roll Society, new ser., xxi), pp. lxiii–lxxxvii. Richardson emphasized that the enormous increase in the number of instruments of public administration during the reign of Henry II was the chief reason for the increased use of the Exchequer seal and the Justiciar's seal. Between 1158 and 1164 Richard of Anstey sought all but one of the writs for his famous legal action from the king overseas, either himself or through an agent (ibid., pp. lxxviii–lxxix). The first certain example of a writ issued under the Exchequer seal seems to be a writ of *perdono* in favour of the Knights Hospitaller of 1174–9 (*Actes de Henri II*, no. DXLII). On this and for further discussion of the whole question see P. Chaplais, *English Royal Documents King John–Henry VI, 1199–1461* (Oxford, 1971), pp. 45–7, where it is suggested that the Exchequer may have been provided with a seal before the accession of Henry II.

instruction from Normandy or Anjou. Sometimes it was dramatic, even catastrophic, as in the Inquest of Sheriffs or the punitive investigations into the royal forest in 1175. It was always predatory.

Although the Pipe Rolls reveal a methodical system of government in England, they also raise an important doubt. Sometimes, in the early years of Henry II, they give the impression that the main results of the king's presence in the country lay in the improvement of his castles and hunting lodges, the maintenance of his hounds and falcons, and the provision of luxuries for the court. Much more seriously, it seems plain that in many years the resources available to the Angevin kings were far less than those which the Normans had enjoyed. On the whole historians have fought shy of the annual totals of the accounts which Sir James Ramsay provided in 1925.[1] His work was received with stringent and justified criticism.[2] Nevertheless the critics agreed that the figures were useful as a 'general guide' to royal resources.[3] These figures are telling. The sole surviving Pipe Roll of Henry I of 1130 records an audit of over £24,500.[4] That was not surpassed by his grandson's exchequer until 1177. The audit in 1157 and 1163 amounted to less than £10,000. It only exceeded £20,000 on four occasions before 1176; after 1176 it only exceeded the figure for 1130 on three occasions, in 1177, 1185, and 1187.[5] Now admittedly the calculation of these totals is hazardous and their significance has perhaps become even more debatable since the publication of Ramsay's book. In certain years, special measures, tallages on the Jews, or the ransom for King Richard, or the Thirteenth of 1207, raised revenue far above the normal. Some major items might

[1] *A History of the Revenues of the Kings of England 1066–1399* (Oxford, 1925).

[2] See *The Times Literary Supplement*, 11 March 1926; R. Fawtier, 'L'Histoire Financière de l'Angleterre', *Le Moyen Âge*, 2nd ser., xxix (1928), 48–67; Mabel Mills in *English Historical Review*, xli (1926), 429–31. Fawtier attributed the review in *T.L.S.* to Tout. There were two main criticisms of Ramsay's book: first that he failed to take note of financial business which lay outside the Exchequer account and secondly that he tended to treat the figures on the rolls as representing revenue and expenditure rather than an audit of account of writs and tallies as well as cash.

[3] 'Le chiffre d'affaires est un miroir assez fidèle de l'état d'une entreprise' (R. Fawtier, op. cit., p. 63). Cf. Mabel M. Mills: 'These statistics furnish a basis of comparison' (op. cit., p. 431).

[4] J. H. Ramsay, op. cit., p. 60. I have excluded Ramsay's guess for the missing counties from this figure.

[5] Ibid., p. 191.

be handled by special exchequers and by-pass the main account,[1] or the Chamber might collect revenue to the same effect.[2] But the Chamber did this already under Henry I.[3] Moreover, these arguments scarcely fill the enormous gap in regular revenue which the Pipe Rolls reveal, especially since the figures take no account of the fact that prices rose between 100 and 200 per cent between 1130 and the end of the century.[4] Allowing for that, and discounting special measures, it seems likely that the audit of 1130 was not matched in real terms with any regularity until the reign of John in the years after 1204. By then the king's energies were concentrated once again within a compact manageable unit of government. That may seem a hazardous assessment. To substantiate the point more work still needs to be done on the administration of Hubert Walter in particular, and on the effectiveness of royal taxation and the extent and consequences of inflation. But it is worth stating in a preliminary fashion for two main reasons. First, the Pipe Roll totals provide no ground at all for assuming that Henry II brought a new efficiency to English government in 1154. The improvement in the king's resources came later, in the main after 1170, when he was already under increasing pressure to maintain and defend his continental holdings. Secondly, the figures give no support at all to the argument that John was incompetent, slack, or improvident in the management of financial affairs.

There are no equivalent records for Maine, Anjou, and the provinces further south.[5] For Normandy occasional totals are

[1] See in particular S. K. Mitchell, *Taxation in Medieval England* (New Haven, 1951), pp. 12–17, 22–33.

[2] See in particular J. E. A. Jolliffe 'The *Camera Regis* under Henry II', *English Historical Review*, lxviii (1953), 1–21, 337–62, and the important criticism thereof by H. G. Richardson, 'The Chamber under Henry II', *English Historical Review*, lxix (1954), 596–611. It should be remembered that when an account was rendered in the Chamber for debts in charge at the Exchequer it would subsequently be cleared on the Pipe Roll. Some of the accounts rendered in the Chamber are therefore included in the Pipe Roll totals.

[3] *Pipe Roll 31 Henry I*, p. 134; H. G. Richardson and G. O. Sayles, *Governance of Medieval England*, pp. 230–1.

[4] The main increase came in the last quarter of the twelfth century. See P. D. A. Harvey, 'The English Inflation of 1180–1220', *Past and Present*, no. 61 (1973), 3–30.

[5] Some attempt was made by Lot and Fawtier to calculate the revenues of these provinces from later records, but it is obviously very insecurely based. They concluded that at the end of the Angevin period they must have yielded far less than Normandy. See F. Lot and R. Fawtier, *Le Premier Budget de la*

possible. In 1198, for example, the receipts from the duchy amounted to 98,000 l. *angevin* (£24,500).[1] But since complete, or nearly complete, rolls have survived only for 1180, 1195, and 1198, any continuous analysis of the Norman accounts is impossible. However, Powicke demonstrated very clearly that Norman revenues were quite inadequate for the demands imposed upon them from 1194 onwards;[2] the recorded expenditure on the construction of Château Gaillard alone, for example, exceeded 46,000 l. *angevin* (£11,500).[3] Moreover, as time passed the Duchy was wasted and reduced by the French. Ultimately the defence of Normandy depended on English treasure.[4] Indeed in the final years of the war money was also sent from England in an attempt to buttress Plantagenet fortunes in Anjou and Gascony.[5] There is nothing in the history of any of these lands to suggest that they were administered more efficiently or exploited more profitably than England. Indeed in 1177 Richard of Ilchester was dispatched from England to remodel the Norman Exchequer.[6] Further south the Plantagenets were content with the development of provincial government around members of the royal family, Queen Eleanor and Richard in Poitou, Count Geoffrey in Brittany, or around the seneschals of the various provinces.[7] They seem to have ensured that the seneschals of

monarchie Française: le compte général de 1202–1203 (Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, Paris, 1932), pp. 138–9.

[1] Lot and Fawtier, op. cit., p. 138.

[2] *The Loss of Normandy*, pp. 233–5.

[3] Ibid., pp. 194, 204–6.

[4] Between October 1202 and October 1203 at least £14,733. 6*s*. 8*d*. was transferred from the English Exchequer to Normandy (*Pipe Roll 5 John*, p. xi). See also F. M. Powicke, op. cit., pp. 160–1. Compare the receipts of English treasure recorded on the Norman roll for 1198 (*Rot. Scacc. Norm.* ii. 301–2).

[5] *Rot. Norm.*, p. 89. *Rot. Litt. Pat.*, p. 22. For the transfer of funds to the southern provinces from the Norman Exchequer see below pp. 243–4.

[6] *Gesta Henrici*, i. 124; *The Historical Works of Ralph of Diceto*, ed. W. Stubbs (Rolls Series, 1876), i. 415. On Richard see Delisle, *Actes de Henri II, Introduction*, pp. 431–4; C. H. Haskins, op. cit., pp. 174–6; F. M. Powicke, op. cit. (1907), 23–4; C. Duggan, 'Richard of Ilchester, Royal Servant and Bishop', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser., xvi (1966), 1–21.

[7] On Anjou see J. Boussard, *Le Comté d'Anjou sous Henri Plantagenêt et ses fils (1151–1204)* (Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, 1938), especially pp. 113–28. Boussard printed a number of administrative acts of the seneschals of Anjou, ibid., pp. 171 ff. See also *Actes de Henri II*, nos. CC, CCXXIV. On Poitou and Aquitaine see A. Richard, *Histoire des comtes de Poitou 778–1204* (Paris, 1903), ii. 260–325.

Anjou and Poitou held office under similar conditions,[1] but there was little in this to compare with the complex machinery of the English or Norman Exchequers.[2]

At the time men were impressed by the apparently enormous wealth which the Angevin kings enjoyed. The anonymous chronicler of Béthune noted with awe that King Richard was:

> extremely rich in land and resources, much more so than the King of France. He could raise a very large army from his vassals and mercenaries, for he could summon English, Normans, Bretons, Manceaux, Angevins, and Poitevins. He also had numerous *routiers* who did much damage to the King of France.[3]

Others told a different story. Gerald of Wales reported a conversation with Ranulf Glanville, who in comparing Normandy with France had simply said that France had been weak at the time of Normandy's rise to power.[4] In the old Justiciar's view it was a question of resources. Already at the time of which the anonymous of Béthune was writing, the reopening of the wars after Richard's return from captivity in Germany, the balance had swung strongly to the side of the Capetians. The most important changes occurred outside the Plantagenet lands, in Amiennois and Artois which came into Philip's hands after the death of Philip of Alsace in 1191. These acquisitions outflanked Normandy, greatly increased the territorial and feudal resources of the French Crown, and advanced the commerce between France and Flanders.[5] By 1202–3, the year of the first chance

[1] See the statements of August 1204 on the powers and perquisites of William des Roches as seneschal of Anjou, Maine, and Touraine, and of Guy, Vicomte of Thouars as seneschal of Poitou and the duchy of Aquitaine (A. Teulet, *Layettes du trésor des Chartes*, Paris, 1863, i, nos. 723, 724, 725). These documents are identical. They must therefore reflect a consciously imposed uniformity, but whether one of the Plantagenets or Philip Augustus was responsible for this is open to question.

[2] Powicke argued that there were 'exchequers' both in Anjou and Poitou (op. cit., pp. 31, 236 n.). He seems to have based this on the following enrolled letter: 'Rex . . . Senescallo Pictavie etc. Mandamus vobis quod faciatis habere Savarico de Malo Leone ducentas libras Andegavensium ad scaccarium nostrum de feodo suo quod ei dedimus' (*Rot. Norm.*, p. 28). This certainly does not imply that there was an exchequer of Anjou and does not refer specifically to an exchequer of Poitou.

[3] *Recueil des historiens de Gaule et de la France*, xxiv, pt. 2, 758.

[4] *Giraldi Cambrensis, Opera*, ed. G. F. Warner (Rolls Series, 1891), viii. 258.

[5] L. L. Borrelli de Serres, *La Réunion des provinces septentrionales à la Couronne par Philippe Auguste* (Paris, 1899).

survival of the royal accounts, the revenues of the French king amounted to 197,000 l. *parisis*, roughly equivalent to £73,000.[1] The English total for that year is very speculative, but may have been not much more than £30,000.[2] By that time the Exchequer was involved in hand-to-mouth measures exporting revenues and treasure urgently to Normandy.[3] In Normandy itself the receipts of the Exchequer were totally committed to fortification and the payment of troops.[4] The rest of the Plantagenet lands could not help. In the end the Angevin kings failed to meet the costs of defence.

Like Sir James Ramsay's totals of the audit of the English Exchequer, the French 'budget' of 1202–3 has been sadly neglected by English historians. The text was published by Brussel in 1727,[5] and the original was destroyed in the fire at the Chambre des Comptes in 1737. It may be that Powicke was influenced by the criticism which Delisle and Borrelli de Serres brought against Brussel's edition.[6] At all events he paid no attention to it in the first edition of *The Loss of Normandy*. He also wrote without the benefit of the printed texts of the English Pipe Rolls for the reigns of Richard and John, and without the more hazardous advantage of Ramsay's totals. His summary was roughly this: that Henry II managed his income carefully

[1] F. Lot and R. Fawtier, op. cit., pp. 28–51.

[2] Ramsay calculated a figure of £24,000 for 1203 before estimating for the levy of the Seventh on moveables. This was collected separately and does not figure on the Pipe Roll. Ramsay's suggested total of £110,000 is a simple arithmetical computation from the known yield of the Thirteenth of 1207. That is quite unacceptable. There is no evidence of widespread resistance to the Seventh, as there was to the Thirteenth. In the case of the carrucage of 1198 and 1200 quick returns were accepted instead of accurate assessment. Of the four writs which refer to the Seventh two excuse payment. Finally the assessment of the Seventh may have been restricted to those who had failed to help the king in Normandy. See J. C. Holt, *The Northerners* (Oxford, 1961), pp. 146–7, and F. Lot and R. Fawtier, op. cit., p. 137. Lot and Fawtier were inclined to place the total of 1203 somewhere between that of 1202 (£24,000) and 1204 (£42,000). That is simply a guess, but it does match the almost complete lack of any evidence that the Seventh was a serious imposition.

[3] *Pipe Roll 4 John*, pp. xiii, xviii–xix; *Pipe Roll 5 John*, p. xi.

[4] F. M. Powicke, op. cit., pp. 160–1.

[5] *Nouvel Examen de l'usage général des fiefs en France* (Paris, 1727), ii. cxxxix–ccx. Brussel's version was reproduced in facsimile by Lot and Fawtier, op. cit. following p. 298.

[6] L. L. Borrelli de Serres, *Recherches sur divers services publics* (Paris, 1895–1909), i. 12; L. Delisle, 'Revenus publics en Normandie au XII^e siècle', *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, 2nd ser., v (1848–9), 176.

and doubled his revenues from England;[1] that the resources of Henry II and Richard were perhaps greater than those of Philip Augustus; that in so far as Philip Augustus's 'financial system was less developed, he suffered by contrast with John';[2] but that 'by mismanagement John brought chaos. . . . The Chamber was a centre of intrigue and recklessness. . . . Treasure poured in and was poured out with heedless confusion'.[3] In 1961 Powicke still held these views.[4] It is now possible to advance an alternative hypothesis: that initially the Plantagenet dominions were not exploited very effectively; that from 1170 Henry II, Richard, John, and their servants did a great deal to increase their means; but that it was perhaps only in England after 1204 that the improvement was sufficient to overtake the consequences of inflation, and that it failed to match the extraordinary advance in Capetian resources revealed in the account of 1202–3. Both these hypotheses emphasize the strain placed on Normandy and England after 1194. But that is the only point where they coincide.

One of the causes of Philip Augustus's success in 1204 was *de bonnes finances*.[5] Equally, one of the reasons for the Plantagenet failure was that their resources were inadequate for the task. A full investigation of this would raise large questions about the wealth of France, about the extent of the demesne of the rival houses within their various lordships, and about the optimum size for a feudal monarchy. But there is also a simple and immediate explanation. The Plantagenet dominions were not designed as an 'empire', as a great centralized administrative structure, which was ultimately broken down by rebellion and French attack. On the contrary these lands were simply cobbled together. They were founded, and continued to survive, on an

[1] *The Loss of Normandy*, 1st edn. (1913), p. 350.

[2] Ibid., pp. 436–7, 366.

[3] Ibid., p. 350.

[4] He noted the edition of the budget by Lot and Fawtier in *The Loss of Normandy*, 2nd edn. (1961), p. 249 n., but did not comment on their assessment of Brussel's work as an *édition soignée* published *avec scrupule* (op. cit., p. 2), or on their comparison of Plantagenet and Capetian resources (ibid., pp. 135–9). Powicke also noted the work of J. E. A. Jolliffe on the royal household under John, but decided to stick to his original views (op. cit., 2nd edn., p. 237 n.). It is fair to say that it would have been difficult to readjust his arguments without an extensive reconstruction of the book.

[5] F. Lot and R. Fawtier, op. cit., p. 139. They add—'en dépit de l'exiguïté du domaine royal de France', but that may not allow enough to the advances made in the 1190s or to the variety of the Crown's interests.

unholy combination of princely greed and genealogical accident. Henry II and his sons imposed some centralized control, some kind of common pattern, but they did so by improvisation rather than premeditated design, for none of the Plantagenets intended their dominions to continue as a single estate. When the ruling house tried to provide for the succession, it simply turned to the ordinary rules of feudal descent which distinguished between inherited and acquired lands.[1] Both Geoffrey of Anjou and Henry planned to partition their lands within these guidelines.[2] Richard also envisaged division.[3] In fact, none

[1] For a discussion of these rules which embodies much of the recent literature see J. C. Holt, 'Politics and Property in Early Medieval England', *Past and Present*, no. 57 (1972), 3–52.

[2] The arrangements made by Geoffrey before his death in 1151 were complicated by the fact that at the time Henry had not yet acquired the succession to England. However, he had already succeeded his father as Duke of Normandy in 1150. There were two peculiarities in the succession as Geoffrey planned it:

(i) He decided that his eldest son should succeed to the lands he had acquired by marriage. This followed inevitably from the fact that Henry was already embroiled in the war against Stephen.

(ii) Since Henry had not yet succeeded in England he allowed him to retain Anjou and Maine until he had fully recovered his mother's inheritance. Once that was secured, he was to restore Anjou and Maine to his younger brother, Geoffrey.

This complicated story depends on William of Newburgh (*Chronicles of the reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*, ed. R. Howlett, Rolls Series, 1884–90, i. 112–14). It gains some support from the fragmentary Angevin chronicle in *Chroniques des Comtes d'Anjou*, ed. L. Halphen and R. Poupardin (Paris, 1913), pp. 251–2. It was accepted by Professor Boussard in *Le Comté d'Anjou* (1938), pp. 68 ff. and *Le Gouvernement d'Henri II* (1956), pp. 8–11, 408–10, as indeed it has been by most authorities, most recently by C. Warren Hollister and T. K. Keefe, 'The Making of the Angevin Empire', *Journal of British Studies*, xii (1973), 17–21. It has been challenged by Professor Warren who would dismiss it as a manifestation of a fraudulent attempt by Geoffrey, Henry's younger brother, to stake a claim to part of the inheritance (*Henry II*, pp. 46–7, 64). I have not been convinced by his argument which is examined critically and in detail in T. K. Keefe, 'Geoffrey Plantagenet's Will and the Angevin Succession', *Albion*, vi (1974), 266–74. This convincingly restates the generally accepted view.

Henry's own arrangements were straightforward. He provided that his eldest surviving son, Henry, should succeed to the lands which his father, Geoffrey, and mother, Matilda, had held and to which he claimed to have succeeded by inheritance. He arranged that Richard should succeed to Aquitaine, which he had acquired by marriage with Eleanor, and he provided for Geoffrey by marrying him to Constance heiress of Brittany. This was confirmed in 1169 when it was approved by Louis VII. It remained in

of these schemes ever took full effect. Henry rejected Geoffrey's settlement,[1] and when, after the death of the Young King in 1183, Henry revised his own arrangements to make a provision for John as Count of Poitou, Richard in turn rejected Henry's arrangements.[2] Neither Henry nor Richard was inspired by a concept of a single united dominion. Each grabbed the whole for himself. Each was ready to divide it subsequently. Accident played a big part. Henry was able to override his father's provision because Geoffrey happened to die before Henry conquered England. Richard would have been restricted to Aquitaine if his elder brother had survived. Any reasonable prediction of the state of these dominions in 1170 would have been that they would descend in three collateral lines: England, Normandy, Maine, and Anjou through the Young King, Aquitaine through Richard, and Brittany through Geoffrey. Any prediction in 1183 would have been that Richard would step into the Young King's shoes and John into Richard's. Even near the end they were no wiser in providing for the succession. In 1199 there was a real difficulty: the claim of a younger son, John, against that of his nephew Arthur, the representative heir of the senior line. Men tried to meet it by arguing the point on political convenience, or by turning to rules of private law which were themselves a product of the chicanery of the moment.[3] The nearest approximation to a theory of sovereign succession was provided by Hubert Walter, Archbishop of Canterbury, who turned to the biblical examples of Saul and

force until the death of the Young King in 1183. Thereafter, Henry intended to transfer Aquitaine to John. In the face of Richard's intransigence he seems to have considered completely new arrangements. In 1187, according to Gerald of Wales, he proposed that John should hold all the continental estates except Normandy which would remain with England as the heritage of the eldest son (*Opera*, viii. 232).

[3] The treaty concluded between Richard and Philip at Messina in March 1191 provided that if Richard had two or more sons, the second should hold either Normandy, or Anjou and Maine, or Aquitaine and Poitou, in chief of the French Crown (*Recueil des actes de Philippe Auguste*, ed. M. H.-F. Delaborde (Paris, 1916, i, no. 376).

The agreement between Philip Augustus and John of January 1194 also provided that if John had two sons or more, each would hold his barony directly of the King of France (*Layettes du trésor des Chartes*, i, no. 412).

[1] C. Warren Hollister and T. K. Keefe, op. cit., pp. 22–5.

[2] *Gesta Henrici*, i. 308, 311; *Diceto*, ii. 18–19.

[3] I have dealt with this matter in a forthcoming paper entitled 'The Plantagenet succession of 1199 and the *casus regis*'.

David to justify a theory of election from the royal line.[1] But that was antiquated and came too late.

These schemes for division will not allow any but the most elementary conception of an Angevin empire. It was adventitious. At any moment the accident of death might lead to division or the revision of a division. Indeed, Henry's sons were not prepared to wait for that and wanted division before their father died. John too, tried to grab a portion while Richard was still king.[2] This family squabble always stood in the way of effective exploitation. More than that, it meant that valuable resources were frittered away. The risks were not just financial. Already in 1156 Henry II performed homage to Louis VII for the succession to Normandy, Maine and Anjou which overrode his father's will.[3] He was the first of the royal line to do so as king.[4] His sons followed suit in seeking Capetian support: the young Henry and Richard in 1173, Richard in 1183, John in 1192. The process was repeated in the next generation when Arthur turned to Philip in 1199. Each one of these appeals put the Angevin dominions at grave risk. Each one encouraged Capetian intrusion. John in 1194 agreed to abandon vital provinces on the Norman frontier.[5] Arthur in 1199 abandoned Normandy *in toto*.[6] Not one of these princes seemed aware that he was rocking the boat.

[1] *Mathaei Parisiensis, chronica majora*, ed. H. R. Luard (Rolls Series, 1872–83), ii. 454–6.

[2] *Layettes du trésor des Chartes*, i, no. 412. John sought to get his hand on all the continental dominions apart from extensive concessions to Philip Augustus. The agreement provided that in any peace with Richard, John would continue to hold directly of the King of France. If that proved impossible, he was to answer to Richard by attorney and never personally.

[3] *Chronica Rogeri de Hoveden*, ed. W. Stubbs (Rolls Series, 1868–71), i. 215.

[4] Henry came to take a serious view of such an homage. At the reconciliation with his sons in 1174 he refused to accept homage from the young Henry 'because he was a king' (*Actes de Henri II*, no. CCCCLXVIII). Compare *Draco Normannicus*, below, p. 244.

[5] Vaudreuil, Évreux, and Verneuil and further withdrawals in Anjou and the Touraine (*Layettes du trésor des Chartes*, i, no. 412). The agreement also confirmed Philip's possession of Loches, Châtillon-sur-Indre, Drincourt, and Arques, which had been surrendered to him as guarantees by Richard's emissaries at Mantes in July 1193. Philip placed John in charge of Arques, Drincourt, and Évreux. See Powicke, op. cit., pp. 97–8. For the date of John's agreement with Philip see Landon, *Itinerary of Richard I*, p. 205 n.

[6] In 1202 Philip Augustus received homage from Arthur for Brittany, Anjou, Maine, and Touraine. Normandy was to remain at Philip's disposal (*Actes de Philippe Auguste*, no. 723).

It was in such an uncertain political climate that the Plantagenet dominions were governed. The effects were curiously contradictory. On the one hand, the family squabble and the increasingly insistent Capetian challenge always threatened to erode or divide the dominions. On the other, the king's response to this and the urgent need to provide resources for war demanded more effective financial exploitation and tighter control through the household and the local organs of government. At one and the same time, therefore, centrifugal and centripetal tendencies were at work. This affected the relationships between the different components of the Plantagenets' lands. New links were forged, old links were weakened. In this complex process England and Normandy began to drift apart.

The governance of the 'empire' depended on separate provincial administrations held together by the itinerant monarch and his household. But in practice these provincial administrations were of unequal weight. On the Continent the real centre lay in Normandy. It was there that Henry II spent the greater part of his time when in France, and the same was true of Richard, despite his southern upbringing. In part this arose from their concentration on the defence of the Norman frontier; in part it recognized that Normandy was the strategic link between England and the south. It meant that the Norman Exchequer at Caen acted as a central base, concentrating the revenues of Normandy, receiving the king's treasure from England through Barfleur, and dispensing funds not only for expenditure on the Norman defences, but also for the king's needs as he travelled south to Chinon or Loches. Treasure went from Caen into Anjou in 1180.[1] Payments were made to the king's knights going to Issoudun and treasure was sent to the king himself at Chinon in 1195.[2] Further treasure went south into Anjou in 1198 and 1201.[3] Under John, the king's receipts from English treasure in Gascony and disbursements therefrom to William des Roches, seneschal of Anjou, were notified to Samson, Abbot of St. Stephen, Caen, and Ralph Labbe, who were directing the day-to-day work of the Exchequer at Caen.[4] By all appearances the Norman Exchequer had all the capacity for independent action of its counterpart in England.[5] By

[1] *Rot. Scacc. Norm.* i. 56.
[2] Ibid. i. 136, 171, 225.
[3] Ibid. ii. 351, 501.
[4] *Rot. Norm.*, p. 36.
[5] I have not found any direct evidence that there was an Exchequer seal in the Norman Exchequer. The matter has not been raised by those who have discussed the seal in England (see above p. 233, n. 1) or by the authorities on

comparison the seneschalseas of the southern provinces were primitive and fragile. In Anjou, the seneschal's powers of jurisdiction as the local agent of the duke were not fully established until 1174.[1] In Poitou and Gascony the seneschalseas were still subject to rearrangement under Richard and John.[2] In the crisis following 1203 the men in charge came to depend on loans and letters of credence from the king to bolster their weakening authority and supplement the meagre resources which John was able to advance to them.[3]

It was not only in financial matters that Normandy played a leading role. Rouen was the nearest approach to a capital city that the Plantagenet kings had on the Continent. The agreement concluded between Henry and Louis VII in 1177 in anticipation of the Crusade provided that Henry's officers would protect and defend Louis's lands as vigorously as if the city of Rouen were under attack, and that Louis's officers would protect Henry's land as vigorously as if the city of Paris were the one to suffer.[4] Rouen and Paris were thus placed on a par. And it was Étienne of Rouen, monk of Bec, who in *Draco Normannicus* maintained that the two kings were on a par. That one should perform homage to the other was shameful. They were 'equal in virtue, equal in honour, equal in their realms'.[5] Indeed, more

Norman institutions. There are numerous *brevia regis* recorded in the Norman Pipe Rolls. This may indicate that there was an Exchequer seal but unfortunately all the surviving Pipe Rolls come from years when the king spent some time in Normandy.

[1] J. Boussard, *Le Comté d'Anjou*, pp. 121–5; *Gouvernement d'Henri II*, p. 287.

[2] See the fluctuations in which Gascony and Poitou were established as a single or separate seneschalseas (F. M. Powicke, op. cit., p. 30). John also established Gerard d'Athée as seneschal of the Touraine in August 1202 (*Rot. Litt. Pat.*, p. 17).

[3] See the letters of 12 December 1201 requiring the Gascon bishops to supply their service to Robert of Thornham as if to the king in person (*Rot. Litt. Pat.*, p. 3b) and letters to the citizens of Bordeaux seeking an aid in February 1202 (ibid., p. 5b). Letters of 19 February 1203, authorizing Robert of Thornham to contract two separate loans of 1,000 m. sterling on behalf of the king on the king's guarantee as principal surety, reflect the deepening crisis (ibid., p. 25b).

[4] *Actes de Henri II*, no. DVI. The phrases were repeated in the renewal of the agreement with Philip Augustus in 1180 (ibid., no. DL).

[5] See the words attributed to the Emperor:

> 'Mandat ne regi Francorum subiciatur
> Cum sibi par virtus, par honor atque thronus'
> (*Chron. Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*, ii. 720).

than that, it was right that the 'indomitable lion' should refuse the yoke, for had not Pepin replaced Childeric, and was not the kingdom of France but a petty remnant of the realm of the Carolingians?[1] Henry II himself played a part in blending Plantagenet rule with the genius of the great Norman dukes. In 1162 the bodies of Richard I and Richard II were raised and translated to Fécamp in his presence; he issued a special protection for those who attended the ceremony.[2] Henry, Eleanor of Aquitaine and Richard Cœur de Lion were all buried at Fontevrault, but Richard bequeathed his heart to the Church of Rouen and it was there too that his elder brother, the Young King, had been buried. For John the Church of Rouen was *mater* and *magistra* to all the Norman churches, the burial place of his brothers and friends, where flourished the deeds of saints whose merits augmented the prosperity of his realm and honour.[3]

The government of the Plantagenets, in changing the role of Normandy in France, also changed her relationship to England. England and Normandy had the closest of ties. Great officials in Church and State: Richard of Ilchester, Walter of Coutances, William fitz Ralph, and great magnates: William de Mandeville Earl of Essex, Ranulph Earl of Chester, Robert fitz Parnel Earl of Leicester, were equally at home on both sides of the Channel. The two Exchequers may, in Richard fitz Neal's words, have differed in important respects[4] but they continued to work hand in hand until the final disaster of 1204. It was not simply that the Norman Exchequer received and accounted for treasure dispatched from England. Debtors holding land on

[1] 'Temnit Francigenis audacia subdere colla
Indomitusque leo, respuit omne jugum' (ibid. ii. 675).
For Childeric and Pepin see ibid. ii. 665–71, and for the comments on the Carolingian Empire ibid. ii. 674.

[2] *Actes de Henri II*, nos. CCXXI–CCXXIII.

[3] *Rot. Litt. Pat.*, p. 19.

[4] 'Verum in plurimis et pene maioribus dissident' (*Dialogus de Scaccario*, p. 14). Fitz Neal did not explain this cryptic remark, but he was concerned at this point with the origins of the English Exchequer. Stapleton emphasized the similarities of the two institutions (*Rot. Scacc. Norm.* i. ix–xiii). Haskins discussed the divergences in *Norman Institutions*, pp. 176–8. Perhaps the most important was in the structure of local government where the superimposition of *bailliages* on the older *vicomtés* and *prepositurae* produced complications of which England was largely free until the establishment of special administrative units based on escheats and quasi-military commands in the reign of John. The Norman developments are very fully discussed by F. M. Powicke, op. cit., pp. 45–56, 68–78.

both sides of the Channel found it convenient to pay into one Exchequer and present writs on account in the other.[1] Moreover, even in the last years of Angevin rule the king's officials saw no difficulty in making complex arrangements which required action in both England and Normandy. Typical of these transactions is the proffer whereby Richard de Soliis fined 600 l. *angevin* for his land in Normandy and England, and to marry as he wished. The Abbot of Caen and Ralph Labbe were instructed to take sureties for the payment and give him seisin in Normandy. They were also to notify the English Justiciar, Geoffrey fitz Peter. If they did not get sureties for the full amount they were to inform Geoffrey of the deficit, for which he would then seek sureties. Geoffrey was instructed separately to enrol only that portion of the debt for which Richard would be responsible in England. In short he was given an instruction which was conditional on the actions of the officials of the Norman Exchequer.[2] Such an arrangement suggests that the closest contact between the two institutions lasted right to the end of the Anglo-Norman realm. But this was not the whole story. Among the enrolments which appeared in the early years of John's reign, the Norman rolls clearly reveal the newer links between Normandy and the other Plantagenet lands on the Continent. One, a roll of charters and cyrographs recorded in the Exchequer at Caen, is somewhat similar to the English *cartae antiquae* rolls.[3] One is a Fine Roll[4] and three are rolls of *contrabrevia*,[5] mainly of the types which, within a year or so, were being described officially as letters close. All these last four rolls include Angevin and Poitevin business as well as Norman. Normandy, Anjou, and Poitou appear as related administrative units, separate from England. An item relating to Ireland which appeared accidentally was annotated—*debuit scribi in rotulo Angliae*.[6] The separation was not unilateral. Items of Norman

[1] This goes back as far as the Exchequer records. See *Pipe Roll 31 Henry I*, pp. 7, 13, 38–9. For later examples see *Pipe Roll 32 Henry II*, p. 60; *Rot. Scacc. Norm.* ii. 364, 443, 496.

[2] *Rot. Norm.*, p. 38. Compare the arrangements for Queen Berengaria's dower (*Rot. Litt. Pat.*, pp. 2b–3). For a loan advanced by the king in Gascony and put in charge at the English Exchequer see ibid., p. 24b. For money advanced to the king in Normandy and treated likewise see *Rot. Lib.* p. 76.

[3] For 2 John (*Rot. Norm.*, pp. 1–22). [4] For 2 John (ibid., pp. 37–44).

[5] For 2, 4, and 5 John (ibid., pp. 22–37, 45–98, 98–122).

[6] Ibid., p. 77. However, one writ dated at Westminster and addressed to William the Treasurer and the Chamberlains of the Exchequer (of England) was included in error (ibid., p. 34).

business appearing on the English rolls at this time were annotated—*debent inrotulari in rotulo Normanniae.*[1] Many of the writs on these rolls are concerned with issues, receipts, or accounts. It is in the enrolments most closely associated with Exchequer business that the separation of England from Normandy first became apparent.

There were other signs that Normandy and England were beginning to go their separate ways. There is no doubt that much of the unique quality of Norman law in France in the thirteenth century derived from its association with England in the twelfth. In the Norman courts the jury played as important a role as in England. The writs of the possessory actions were in regular use, most of them in a closely similar form. Justices held assizes. Litigants made final concords in the courts. However, the duchy developed its own variants of this system. For example, although the writs of petty assize stemmed from a common stock the time-limit applied to such actions was quite different from that in England. Moreover in Normandy there was no writ of naifty, no *praecipe quod reddat*, no general rule of *nemo tenetur* and nothing similar to the English writ of right.[2] Even more important was that the law of inheritance and succession was slowly settling into different patterns. In England by Glanville's day all land held by military service was indivisible and descended by primogeniture; provision was made for younger sons by enfeoffments held of the senior line.[3] In Normandy in contrast estates might still be divided if there was more than one feof; provision was made for younger sons by the practice of *parage*.[4] These rules were still debated both in England and Normandy, but no one apparently pointed to the virtues of a common pattern or suggested that different rules might prove awkward to families holding on both sides of the Channel. It is probable that it did not seem to matter,

[1] *Rot. Lib.*, p. 68.

[2] For a convenient summary of this see R. C. van Caenegem, *The Birth of the English Common Law* (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 57–9. For the jury see C. H. Haskins, op. cit., pp. 196–238. For examples of writs and further comment on differences of procedure between England, Normandy, and the Channel Isles see *Early Register of Writs*, ed. Elsa de Haas and G. D. G. Hall (Selden Society, lxxxvii, 1970), pp. xcix–civ. There are further examples of writs earlier than 1219 in the cartulary of S. Giles of Pont-Audemer (Rouen, Bibliothèque Municipale, MS. Y 200 fols. 44^{v}–45^{v}).

[3] Glanvill, *De Legibus*, ed. G. D. G. Hall (London, 1965), p. 75.

[4] *Coutumiers de Normandie*, ed. E. J. Tardif, i. 8–9; iii. 79–83. R. Génestal, *Le Parage normand*, pp. 16–30.

that these variants were seen as further pieces in the jigsaw of local customs and procedures over which the courts presided. No one could have been wary of these changes on the ground that they contributed to an imminent separation of the kingdom from the duchy, for that could not be foreseen. But once the separation had taken place, these differences in law and government could but help to perpetuate it.

However, some matters were obvious, especially war and the costs of war. In these, probably more than in any other matter, the accession of the Plantagenets marked a turning-point, for these kings assumed that the resources of the Anglo-Norman realm were available to them in all parts of the new dominion. Hitherto there had been no precise definition of the limits within which the tenants-in-chief provided military service. They accepted in a rough and ready way that they might be called upon to fight or provide service or aid anywhere in England or Normandy, that they might be involved in war with Brittany or against the French in the Vexin or elsewhere over the Norman border, and that those with lands in England might serve against the Welsh or Scots. But campaigns further afield had never arisen. Now, suddenly, their responsibilities were vastly extended. In 1158 Henry II mustered the Norman host against Brittany and then, after a diplomatic success over Conan Count of Brittany, led it south into Anjou and Poitou, where he seized Thouars.[1] In 1159 the great scutage of Toulouse established the precedent that the service due from both Normandy and England might be extended to the furthest provinces which the Plantagenets could claim. The last great demand of this kind in Normandy was made in 1202 when service and aid was sought *pro exercitu Gasconiae* and numerous prests were paid to the barons and knights who served on the campaign.[2] Thereafter England continued to bear the burden alone in the Poitevin expeditions of 1206 and 1214.

In England the imposition of these demands led to isolated protests and then finally to the outcry against overseas service

[1] Robert de Torigni, *Chronique*, ed. L. Delisle (Société de l'histoire de Normandie, 1872–3), i. 311–13.

[2] For service and the aid see *Rot. Scacc. Norm.* ii. 530, 545, 551, 566, and *Rot. Norm.* p. 92. For the prests see *Rot. Scacc. Norm.* ii. 510, 536–7, 545, 557, and S. R. Packard, *Miscellaneous Records of the Norman Exchequer 1199–1204* (Smith College Studies in History, Northampton, Mass., 1927), pp. 17, 22, 38. It should be noted that the prests were advances paid to knights who attended the campaign, not forced loans raised by the king, as they are interpreted by Powicke (op. cit., p. 154 n.).

of 1213 and 1214. The objectors had a case. They were bound to serve in England; by custom they served in Normandy; but on what ground could they be required to serve in lands which had not been part of the realm when their fiefs were established? On the Continent the arguments were apparently less vociferous, but by the thirteenth century and probably earlier provincial custom resolved into a compromise that service outside the province should be at the prince's cost.[1] In England all the pressures, military, financial, administrative, led ultimately to the crisis of 1215 and Magna Carta. On the Continent also similar pressures produced similar results. In February 1214, Thomas Count of le Perche, who was to die in battle beneath the walls of Lincoln castle three years later, granted to his knights of the castlery of Bellême that he would not levy impositions on them and their men except on four occasions: his first military campaign, his first ransom in war, the knighting of his eldest son, and the marriage of his eldest daughter.[2] But on the whole the effects of the war were different on each side of the Channel. England suffered mainly in money and other resources and she responded ultimately in Magna Carta. Normandy suffered war and destruction and responded by defecting. Those holding land on both sides of the Channel were torn one way or the other.

[1] Professor Boussard has suggested that Norman military tenants could not be required to serve outside the duchy except at the king's expense (*Gouvernement d'Henri II*, p. 416; 'L'Enquête de 1172' *Recueil de travaux offert à M. Clovis Brunel*, Paris, 1955, i. 204–8). This is not borne out by the evidence of the Gascon expedition of 1202. Those who served were military tenants of the duchy; they received prests, but prests were accountable at the Exchequer. See the comments on the Praestita Roll of 14–18 John in *Pipe Roll 17 John*, pp. 71–80. On the limitation of military service in other provinces of the dominions see P. Chaplais, 'Le duché-pairie de Guyenne', *Annales du Midi*, lxix (1957), 14–15.

[2] 'Thomas comes Pertici, omnibus ad quos praesentes litterae pervenerint salutem in Domino. Ad universorum notitiam volumus pervenire quod milites nostri de castellario Beilimensi talliam de feodis suis et hominibus suis nobis debent tantummodo feodaliter pro his quatuor rebus quae sequuntur. Pro prima militia nostra, pro prima captione nostra de guerra, pro militia filii nostri primogeniti viventis, et pro prima filia nostra maritanda. Praeter has tallias nec a militum feodis, nec ab eorum hominibus, tallias possumus feodaliter extorquere. Et ne hujusmodi libertas ab aliquo heredum nostrorum in posterum infringatur, eam sigilli caractere fecimus communiri. Actum, anno gratiae MCCXIIII mense Februario' (E. Martène and V. Durand, *Veterum Scriptorum et Monumentorum amplissima collectio*, Paris, 1724, i, col. 1117). It seems necessary to read 'militia' in two different senses, both of which are permissible.

The Normans were accustomed to war with the French over the Vexin and other debatable frontiers. From 1154 they had to face in addition war in Normandy brought on by events in distant parts of France over which they had no control. In 1159 Henry II attacked Toulouse; as a result, war broke out along the Norman border.[1] In 1167 there was a dispute between the two kings over their respective suzerainty in the Auvergne, followed in the same year by a rebellion of the Lusignans in Poitou; Louis devastated the land around Pacy and raided the Vexin.[2] In 1173, when Normandy was the last province to break out into rebellion, the Count of Boulogne attacked Aumale and Neufmarché, and Louis VII invaded the Vexin and burned Verneuil; the next year Louis and the Young King attacked Rouen.[3] True, there were occasions when the Normans derived some benefit from the provinces further south. In May 1194 an Angevin contingent was in the army which relieved Verneuil,[4] and at Vaudreuil in May 1195 Richard was able to muster a host from England, Brittany, Poitou, Maine, Anjou, and Gascony.[5] But these multiple resources were at the king's service and convenience. When the Archbishop of Rouen and the king's officers concluded a truce with Philip in 1194, Richard insisted that it did not apply to the barons of Poitou. He maintained that it would infringe the law and custom of Poitou if Poitevin magnates were prevented from settling differences by the sword.[6] The war went on.

In the end Normandy was ravaged: her towns, Évreux, Dieppe, Verneuil sacked and burned, her churches so devastated that both Philip and Richard suffered interdicts on their lands for the damage they had caused, her commerce interrupted and her monetary system shattered.[7] England, in contrast, only

[1] Torigni, i. 325; 'Continuatio Beccensis', ibid. ii. 174.

[2] Torigni, i. 363–6.

[3] Torigni, ii. 39–42; *Gesta Henrici*, i. 47–8, 53–6, 73–4.

[4] Diceto, ii. 116–17; F. M. Powicke, op. cit., p. 102.

[5] *Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal*, ed. P. Meyer (Société de l'histoire de France, 1891–1901), lines 10560–3.

[6] *Hoveden*, iii. 253–5.

[7] The currency of Normandy was the *livre angevin*. It was replaced under the Capetians by the *livre tournois*. At the time of the collapse and in the immediately subsequent years payment was often arranged *usualis monete currentis per Normanniam*, or *communis monete*, or some such phrase which indicates the general uncertainty. There is a good run of charters illustrating this in the cartulary of S. Giles of Pont-Audemer (Rouen, Bibliothèque Municipale, MS. Y 200).

suffered war during the rebellion of 1173–4 and in John's abortive rising of 1194. The comparative calm at home, the long absences of the king abroad, the relative independence of English government in the absence of the king, could foster a comfortable sense of detachment from events across the Channel. After Gervase of Canterbury, a nearly contemporary witness, had commented on the disasters in Normandy in 1203 he added: 'England meanwhile, by the grace of God and under the guidance of Hubert Archbishop of Canterbury and Geoffrey fitz Peter, enjoyed tranquillity and peace'.[1] This was not simply the insular smugness of a cloistered monk. Some time before 1205 Roger Bigod Earl of Norfolk, confirmed a lease made by one of his knights to Wymondham Abbey which ran for twelve years 'from the Christmas after Hubert Walter, Archbishop and Justiciar, first came to Norwich'.[2] Roger Bigod himself in 1198 confirmed to the prior of St. Felix of Waltham all the grants made by his ancestors and tenants 'up to the feast of St. Egidius following the transfer of the Justiciarship of England from Hubert Walter to Geoffrey fitz Peter'.[3] Those provisions reflected the regular government of the Justiciars which provided the peace and tranquility of which Gervase wrote.

Gervase's reaction was simply one among many. For some the rule of the Angevins was a great enterprise, which for a time opened wide horizons and provided splendid opportunities for advancement. Walter of Coutances, a Cornish clerk, became Archbishop of Rouen and for a time Justiciar of England.[4] William Marshal, a landless knight became lord of Longueville and Earl of Pembroke. Others like Hubert de Burgh the defender of Chinon, Gerard d'Athée the castellan of Loches, Robert of Thornham seneschal of Poitou and Gascony, were all climbing towards landed prosperity through administrative and military service to the Crown, even as Normandy collapsed. Some like Bertrand de Born revelled in the struggle and indulged in extravagant glorifications of war.[5] Others, like Waleran 4th

[1] *Historical Works of Gervase of Canterbury*, ed. W. Stubbs (Rolls Series, 1879–80), ii. 95.

[2] B.M. Cotton MS., Titus C viii, fol. 67^{v}. I am obliged for this and the following reference to Miss Susan Atkin.

[3] B.M. Cotton MS., Domitian A x, fol. 197^{v}.

[4] On Walter's early career see L. Delisle, *Actes de Henri II, Introduction*, pp. 106–13.

[5] Bertrand's best known passage is accessible in Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society* (London, 1961), p. 293.

Earl of Warwick, fined with the king that they might be allowed to go home.[1] The Anglo-Norman nobles were still apt for war. They would still cross half Christendom for adventure and spiritual reward in the Holy Land.[2] In Ireland they could still revive the old buccaneering enthusiasm which had brought their ancestors to mastery in England.[3] But by these standards the French conflict was the wrong war in the wrong place. It was too expensive. It put the homeland at risk and it brought no profit except to those who used it to seek advancement within the polity.

In imaginative words, Powicke attributed to the collapse of Normandy 'the inexplicable character which attaches to some men's moral downfall. With no apparent failure, maintaining to the end the exercise of their peculiar virtues, they lose their hold on life'.[4] He believed that the Norman power of resistance had been sapped by the autocratic rule of the Plantagenet kings.[5] Few would now accept such a conclusion, even of King John. But it is certainly true that Anglo-Norman resistance lacked moral fibre. Sir Richard Southern has shown how men's minds were dominated by the prestige of France and by the literary conventions of *douce France* stemming from the *Chanson de Roland*.[6] There was nothing equivalent on the Plantagenet side. Some in England and Normandy, especially perhaps those subject to the influence of the Schools, shared in the respect for Paris and things French. But below that level among the annalists and chroniclers who recorded the story of the war, there was a different impression, one of growing provincial suspicion and prejudice. In Poitou Henry II came to be regarded as an arbitrary tyrant fittingly dubbed the King of the North as a mark of his barbarity. Aquitaine and Poitou were urged to rejoice at

[1] *Chancellor's Roll 8 Richard I*, p. 58.

[2] Among those who planned to embark on a crusade or pilgrimage to the Holy Land in 1202–4 were Gerard de Furneval, Henry du Puiset, Hugh count of S. Paul, and Henry de Longchamp. Geoffrey fitz Peter, the Justiciar of England, William de Stuteville, Hugh Bardolf, and William Briwerre all took vows but withdrew because of their duties at home (F. M. Powicke, op. cit., pp. 245–7).

[3] Both William de Briouze and William Marshal were present in the defence of Normandy. They were also of great importance in the occupation of Ireland.

[4] Op. cit., 249.

[5] Ibid., pp. 248–9.

[6] R. W. Southern, 'England's First Entry into Europe', in *Medieval Humanism and other Studies* (Oxford, 1970), pp. 135–57.

his discomfiture; England and Neustria were threatened with desolation.[1] To the Normans, on the other hand, the Poitevins seemed treacherous.[2] In England William de Longchamps, a Norman, was attacked as a foreigner who ignored English ways,[3] and at Canterbury Richard's Norman ministers were regarded as untrustworthy and capable of treason.[4] In Normandy, conversely, the surrender of Vaudreuil by Saer de Quenci and Robert fitz Walter gave rise to the view that the English surrendered castles which they should have guarded as the Normans did: this a comment on two barons of unquestionable continental stock.[5] There was no common ethos; no great tradition to set against the French. In the *Roman des Franceis*, André of Coutances preserved the tale, derived from Wace, that Arthur had conquered the French, but in the crude form of a burlesque which also poked fun at the English under their mythical king Arflet of Northumberland.[6] There was nothing in this to inspire loyalty throughout the Plantagenet lands.[7] Indeed, the Arthurian story itself was now divisive. In England the Barnwell chronicler asserted that the Bretons, in pressing the claims of the young prince Arthur, were seeking to revive the glories of the ancient Arthur and were thereby plotting to destroy the English race.[8] Here a great legend, which might have been developed

[1] The continuator of Richard of Poitou in *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, xii. 419–20.

[2] *Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal*, lines 12545–50; *Histoire des ducs de Normandie et des rois d'Angleterre*, ed. F. Michel (Société de l'histoire de France, 1859), p. 96.

[3] *Hoveden*, iii. 142–3; discussed by R. W. Southern, op. cit., pp. 141–2.

[4] Gervase of Canterbury, i. 515.

[5] *Histoire des ducs de Normandie*, p. 130.

[6] This has now been given a scholarly edition by A. J. Holden in *Études de langue et de littérature du moyen âge offertes à Félix Lecoy* (Paris, 1973), pp. 213–33. I am obliged to Professor Wolfgang Van Emden for drawing my attention to it.

[7] Apart from its tone, which would scarcely inspire anyone, the *Roman* is entirely Anglo-Norman in its material and context. André concludes:

> Que Englais, Breton, Angevin,
> Mansel, Gascoign at Peitevin
> Tienent Andreu a bon devin
> Quer partot dit veir. C'est la fin
> (ibid., p. 225)

That is the solitary hint of a wider background. André also called on Flemings, Burgundians, and Lorrainers to warrant the truth of his tale (ibid.).

[8] *Memoriale fratris Walteri de Coventria*, ed. W. Stubbs (Rolls Series, 1872–3), ii. 196.

to rival the powerful French tradition of the *Roland*, was turned instead to separate and divide the countries which had fostered it. At the last count staunch men on the Plantagenet side, like William Marshal or Baldwin of Béthune, honourable within the conventions of the day, found their strength and justification in a code of feudal loyalty. It allowed William to perform homage to both Philip Augustus and John.

These conditions, material and moral, look like symptoms of collapse, as Powicke suggested. That represents an Anglo-Norman or Plantagenet point of view. The Capetian attitude was different and straightforward. It was simply that the Plantagenet dominions, with the exception of England, were part of the realm of France. In 1184–5, on the occasion of renewed attempts by Henry II to get archiepiscopal status for the Breton bishopric of Dol, Philip Augustus wrote to Pope Lucius III defending the rights of the Archbishop of Tours whose authority, he wrote, extended throughout Lower Brittany 'to the furthest corners of our realm as far as the ocean'.[1] In his agreement with King Richard at Messina in 1191 Philip made the same point in another fashion: he referred to the major divisions of the Plantagenet lands simply as baronies.[2] Similar terms were used in the agreement with John of 1194.[3] Once there was reasonable parity in resources, the main weakness of the Plantagenets and the main strength of the Capetians lay in the feudal suzerainty of the kings of France. Using that they undermined the structure of the Plantagenet dominion, sapping the feudal loyalties which bound it together. In the end the two provinces to survive the attack, England and Gascony, were those not subject to the Crown of France.

One such story begins at Tours, where both the archbishopric and the great abbey of St. Martin enjoyed special privileges under the French Crown. They were demesne churches of the king, both in Tours and in their surrounding properties. As a result the Plantagenets could never make the town a major Angevin centre of government like Angers or Le Mans. Louis VII and Philip II were particularly attentive to these churches' needs, confirming their privileges and helping them to resist the nascent commune in the town.[4] There was another side to

[1] *Actes de Philippe Auguste*, i, no. 136.

[2] Ibid. i, no. 316.

[3] *Layettes du trésor des Chartes*, i, no. 412.

[4] A. Luchaire, *Études sur les actes de Louis VII* (Paris, 1885), nos. 75, 117, 120, 121, 397, 752; *Actes de Philippe Auguste*, i, nos. 122, 331.

this manifest concern. Sometime in 1167, when Louis was at war with Henry, he wrote as follows to Bartholomew, Dean of the church of St. Martin:

> We wish to be informed about the King of England's intentions. Will he be advancing into Poitou or returning to the Norman sea-coast? If you are certain about this send us the information by letter to be returned with our sergeants. If the matter is uncertain, send such rumours as you have through one of them and retain the other until you are able to give us further information.[1]

An identical message was sent to William, Treasurer of St. Martin.[2] It is surely not surprising that the Plantagenets became impatient. One of Richard's first acts was to try to reach a settlement. In July 1189, before going to England for his coronation, he and King Philip met in the chapter house of the abbey. After a full inquiry they agreed on a long, detailed definition of the respective rights of the abbey and the count of Anjou. This laid down that the count could not ask for military service against the king of France or tax the men of the abbey, or seize its estates, possessions or property. The agreement also embarked on a long complaint that the count's men had disturbed these and other rights in the past and in particular that the count had demanded homage from twelve representatives on behalf of the men of Châteauneuf, saving the fealty due to the king of France and the Church, as safeguard for their property during his war with the king. The agreement was confirmed by the two kings in July 1190.[3] By then Richard had also settled with the archbishop on detailed arrangements for the partition of customary renders and jurisdictional rights between the officers of the archbishop and the count. This also Philip confirmed, emphasizing as he did so that all these rights were of his fee.[4] The agreement was of no avail. Its advantages to Richard are not obvious. In June 1194 he ejected the canons of St. Martin and confiscated their revenues.[5] Philip replied on the instant by confiscating all the property, revenues, and chattels of the churches and abbeys of the province of Rouen on which he could lay his hands.[6] It was not until November, that the two kings restored the ejected clergy.[7]

[1] *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, xvi. 141–2. [2] Ibid.
[3] *Actes de Philippe Auguste*, i, no. 361. [4] Ibid., no. 357.
[5] *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, xviii. 293.
[6] *Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton*, ed. H. F. Delabord (Société de l'Histoire de France, 1882–5), i. 128–9.
[7] *Actes de Philippe Auguste*, i, no. 483; Diceto, ii. 122.

This is of interest not simply because the seizure of the property of the Normans was triggered by events outside the duchy, but also because of the light it throws on what was in fact a border conflict. In Tours the counts of Anjou were hedged about by rights of property and jurisdiction which were alms of the Crown of France. The count and the Church shared customs, jurisdiction, and administrative responsibilities in the town, the suburbs, and the surrounding estates and forests. Neither the count's nor the archbishop's reeve could rent the pannage without the consent of the other; nor could the agents of either party settle the tolls on ships coming up the Loire except in consort. Here the demarcation between Capetian and Plantagenet France was defined in terms, not of frontiers, but of feudal rights.

That was true in general and on a larger scale. For example, the older Norman monastic foundations all held property and rights in the Île-de-France, some of it since Carolingian days. One of Louis VII's first acts of 1137 was to issue instructions giving the monks of Bec protection and freedom from custom at the tolls of Poissy and Mantes Gassicourt.[1] This order was repeated in 1176.[2] In 1152–3 he confirmed and extended rights of assart at Genainville, near Mantes, which Louis the Fat had granted to the monks of Jumièges and in 1168 he confirmed their possession of rights of tithe in the church of St. Martin de Bouafle near Meulan.[3] In 1165 he confirmed gifts which Aubrey his chamberlain had made to the house of Villers St. Paul, a priory of the abbey of Fécamp.[4] In 1169 he confirmed the manor of Pecq in the Oise valley to the monks of St. Wandrille and in 1177 issued a general confirmation to St. Wandrille of its rights of free passage on the Seine and its property in the dioceses of Amiens, Beauvais, Paris, and Chartres.[5] In these matters Philip Augustus followed the example of his father in confirming and extending the privileges of the Norman Church in his own dominions. Jumièges, Bec, St. Ouen, and Foucarmont all benefited.[6] As the war progressed so royal patronage was

[1] *Actes de Louis VII*, no. 5.
[2] Ibid., no. 713.
[3] Ibid., nos. 282, 557.
[4] Ibid., no. 515.
[5] Ibid., nos. 572, 729.
[6] *Actes de Philippe Auguste*, i, nos. 172, 243 for Jumièges; i, no. 283, ii, nos. 646, 674, for Bec; i, nos. 366, 381 for St. Ouen; ii, no. 541 for Foucarmont.

extended, confirming revenues at Pacy to the monks of Ivry,[1] and at Évreux all the gifts made to the cathedral church by William de Vernon, William de Pacy, and Robert Earl of Leicester.[2] Philip was particularly attentive to Walter of Coutances Archbishop of Rouen, offering him protection, safe conduct and hospitality when the campaign of 1196 laid waste the archbishop's lands in the Vexin and provoked him into imposing an Interdict and protesting in exile at Cambrai.[3] Royal benevolence did not go unacknowledged. In 1185 Henry Abbot of Fécamp wrote to Philip Augustus asking him to take into his custody and protection the abbey's property and men at Boissy-Mauvoisin, which lay just beyond the border of the Norman Vexin. His letter ended—*Bene semper valeat dominus noster rex.*[4] In 1204 the Norman church stood aside and then made its peace as the duchy fell to Philip.[5]

Laymen were subject to similar influences. In 1157 Louis VII entered on an agreement with Waleran, Count of Meulan, lord of Beaumont-le-Roger, Brionne, and Pont-Audemer, and of considerable properties in England. The agreement concerned his honour of Gournay centred on the Marne above Paris. It allowed the King of France to call upon the military service of the men of the honour for a day, and more only if they wished. It provided that Gournay should be at peace if the king did evil in the comté of Meulan, but allowed them to support Waleran if the king sought to deprive him of the comté. It made royal justice available to all those men of Gournay who wished to appeal to it.[6] That was not quite an imposition of sovereignty; both parties had something to bargain with; but it was the thin end of the wedge. Louis's superiority was acknowledged implicitly in the same year in a confirmation of the properties of the church of Notre Dame de Gournay.[7] The agreement may have had wider political repercussions. Henry II seems to have got wind of something he did not like. In 1161 he seized the castles of Count Waleran and other Norman barons and entrusted them to faithful officers.[8] Waleran lived on to die as a monk of Préaux

[1] Ibid. ii, no. 511.

[2] Ibid. ii, no. 528.

[3] Ibid. ii, nos. 520–2.

[4] *Layettes du trésor des Chartes*, i, no. 351.

[5] F. M. Powicke, 'The Angevin administration of Normandy', *English Historical Review*, xxi (1906), 639–40.

[6] *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, xvi. 15–16.

[7] *Actes de Louis VII*, no. 386.

[8] Torigni, i. 331.

in 1166. He had been a great Trimmer.[1] The same Norman poet who celebrated Henry II as the successor of the Norman dukes presented Waleran of Meulan as the flower of the Norman nobility.[2]

The arrangements between Louis and Waleran were part of a shift in the feudal balance from the Plantagenets to the Capetians which began slowly under Louis VII and then became precipitous as Philip II acquired authority and influence. Its progress is apparent in the treaties concluded between the two royal houses. In 1160 the balance favoured Henry II. In the border province of the Vexin, the fees of the Archbishop of Rouen, the Earl of Leicester, and the Count of Évreux were used to define the political boundary; their loyalties were thus firmly placed on the Norman side. Not only that but Henry was able to obtain the restoration in the Vexin of two lords who had sided with him, Jocelin Crispin and Joel de Baudemont; Louis was to act towards them with the advice of the King of England. Louis also agreed to accept the full reinstatement of Simon Count of Évreux, another of Henry's allies; he abandoned the homage which he had received from some of Simon's tenants and agreed to a reasonable adjudication on rights in dispute between him and the count.[3] By 1177 the two kings were roughly on a par. In their agreement drawn up as a preliminary to a Crusade they simply provided that such differences as arose between them would be subject to the arbitration of twelve barons and bishops, six chosen by each side.[4] That was repeated in 1180.[5] The balance between the two changed markedly thereafter. In 1189 Philip was able to insist that all those who had deserted Henry and supported Richard's rebellion need not return to Henry's allegiance until a month before Richard's departure on the Crusade. Henry's barons and knights were to swear that if he withdrew from the settlement they would aid Philip and Richard against him.[6] Philip never lost this capacity to impose feudal conditions. In the negotiations of 1193 he provided that Hugh de Gournay could continue in his allegiance to the King of France unless he wished to return

[1] For his earlier career in Stephen's reign see G. H. White, 'The Career of Waleran, Count of Meulan and Earl of Worcester (1104–66)', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 4th ser., xvii (1934), 19–48.

[2] *Chron. Stephen, Henry II and Richard*, ii. 766–70.

[3] *Actes de Henri II*, i, no. CXLI.

[4] Ibid. ii, no. DVI.

[5] Ibid. ii, no. DL.

[6] *Gesta Henrici*, ii. 70; *Hoveden*, ii. 365; Diceto, ii. 63–4.

to the allegiance of King Richard, that Robert Count of Meulan who had fought on his side should recover the lands which he held of Richard, that Geoffrey Count of Le Perche should recover his rents in England and that Richard should assign lands to Louis Count of Blois.[1] In 1160 Henry II was able to provide for the restoration of his followers in the French demesne. In 1193 Philip II was able to provide for his followers within the Plantagenet dominion. At that point Richard was in prison in Germany but his return made little difference. At the truce of Tillières of 1194 a much longer list of those who had gone over to Philip were included in its terms.[2] Richard made only a slight recovery in the Treaty of Louviers of 1196. He was able to provide that Stephen de Longchamps should hold Baudemont of Philip and that the men of Hugh de Gournay who had fought on his side should be restored, but he now had to guarantee to Philip the good behaviour of the Earl of Leicester and Richard de Vernon, both of whom lost heavily under the agreement.[3] By 1198 the balance had tilted further. When Richard asked that the Count of Flanders and others who had recently joined him should be included in the agreement, Philip refused and negotiations broke down.[4]

The effect of this was to undermine the Norman frontier. Administratively it depended on the Exchequer; that was still functioning in 1203. Militarily it depended on the great castles of the border provinces; some of the most crucial of these were abandoned by Richard at Louviers in 1196 and by John at Le Goulet in 1200. Politically it depended on the great families of the Norman March. Many of these were also feudal dependents of the King of France outside Normandy, or close relatives of such dependents, or dependents of close allies of the king. Ralph of Exoudun, Count of Eu *iure uxoris* held land around St. Valery-sur-Somme and Abbeville where he had control of the mint. Here he was dependent on the Count of Ponthieu, a direct vassal of the French Crown. His own patrimony lay in Poitou. He was the brother of Hugh de Lusignan and was one of the leaders of the rebellion against John in 1201.[5] Hugh de

[1] *Hoveden*, iii. 217–20.

[2] *Hoveden*, iii. 257–60; F. M. Powicke, op. cit., p. 108.

[3] *Layettes du trésor des Chartes*, i, no. 431. Robert Earl of Leicester surrendered Pacy and Richard de Vernon, Vernon. See ibid., nos. 433–41; *Actes de Philippe Auguste*, ii, no. 519.

[4] *Hoveden*, iv. 61.

[5] J. Boussard, *Gouvernement d'Henri II*, p. 88; F. M. Powicke, op. cit. pp. 141, 143–4, 147 n.

Gournay, who acquired an evil reputation as a traitor for his tergiversations, held lands over the Norman border in Amienois and Beauvaisis. He owed his tenure of the county of Aumale to Philip and as Count of Aumale was a tenant of the Count of Flanders.[1] The counts of Évreux had tried to resolve their loyalties by separating French and Norman estates between two collateral lines.[2] Amaury Count of Évreux was drawn to the side of England by his possession of the part of the honour of William Earl of Gloucester. Even so, for a time in 1203, he followed his father-in-law, Hugh de Gourney, into the French camp.[3] Further west Robert Count of Sées was cousin to William Count of Ponthieu brother-in-law of Philip Augustus. He married his daughter to Theobald VI Count of Blois.[4] His defection in 1203 was decisive since it carried the great border fortress of Alençon.[5] Meanwhile, further into the Norman interior, Peter, son of Robert Count of Meulan, surrendered Beaumont-le-Roger to the French. In trying to balance along a knife-edge of divided loyalties Count Robert lost his lands and ended his days as King John's pensioner.[6] This group of families had a long history of rebellion and defection. Their ancestors had joined in rebellion with the Young Henry in 1173.[7] But they were only the tip of the iceberg. When Richard I captured Philip's baggage in the flight from Vendôme in 1194, he is said to have discovered numerous charters in which Normans pledged themselves to the French king.[8] When John tried to relieve Alençon in 1203, he was apparently deterred from pressing his action by false rumours, spread within his army, that the French king was at hand with a relieving force.[9]

[1] *Rot. Scacc. Norm.* i, pp. clxxix–clxxx; J. Boussard, op. cit., pp. 88–9; F. M. Powicke, op. cit., pp. 108, 340–1.

[2] See below p. 262.

[3] *Rot. Norm.*, p. 92; F. M. Powicke, op. cit., pp. 175–6.

[4] This apparently distant relationship hides a close link between the counts of Sées and Ponthieu, which arose from the division of the lands of William Talvas, Count of Sées (d. 1171). See below p. 261. For the marriage of Robert's daughter see *L'Art de vérifier les dates* (Paris, 1783–7), ii. 884.

[5] F. M. Powicke, op. cit., pp. 156–60. Count Robert was apparently assisted at Alençon by Juhel de Mayenne, one of the greatest barons of Maine and Brittany, and a staunch supporter of Arthur. See *Diplomatic Documents*, ed. P. Chaplais (London, 1964), i, no. 206.

[6] F. M. Powicke, op. cit., pp. 161, 344–5.

[7] J. Boussard, op. cit., pp. 477–8 n.

[8] *Hoveden*, iii. 256.

[9] *Diplomatic Documents*, p. 140.

The final collapse came suddenly. Men were singularly ill prepared for it. It is probable that no one in 1199, not even King Philip, intended or expected what had happened by 1204. The final conflict did not begin as a fight to the death for Normandy but as a dispute about the Plantagenet succession. The competing claims of John and his nephew Arthur involved a real debate about representative succession. John and his supporters settled the matter rapidly without reference to Philip. In so doing they deprived him of the opportunity to divide the Plantagenet lands. If the matter had come to him for judgement he would have had at least one precedent in mind. When William Talvas Count of Sées died in 1171, he was succeeded in Normandy, Maine, and England by John his younger son.[1] In 1126–9 he had already arranged for his eldest son, Guy, to succeed him in the county of Ponthieu. In 1147 Ponthieu descended to Guy's son, John, with whom it remained in 1171. Hence on William Talvas's death there was a division between a younger son and a grandson who were in the same relationship as John and Arthur in 1199.[2] All this must have been known to Philip for he married his sister Alice to the grandson's successor, William Count of Ponthieu.[3] That he had some such solution in mind seems clear both from the Treaty of Le Goulet, which made no formal statement on John's position in Anjou,[4] and from the agreement of July 1202 with Arthur which reserved Normandy to Philip.[5] By then Philip clearly intended to retain Normandy for the Crown. The capture of Arthur at Mirebeau and his subsequent murder made that certain.

Feudal relationships could not be adjusted at all easily to such life-and-death conflict. The customs governing succession

[1] Torigni, ii. 28.

[2] The details are given in *L'Art de vérifier les dates*, ii. 753–4, 883–4. Both branches of the family agreed to William Talvas's cession of Alençon and Roche Mabile to Henry II in 1166 (Torigni, i. 360). The descent is of interest in that Ponthieu, which was the inheritance of William Talvas's mother, descended in the elder line, and Alençon, William's patrimony, in the junior line. See also *Recueil des Actes des Comtes de Pontieu (1026–1279)*, ed. Clovis Brunel (Paris, 1930), pp. v–vi, 38–133.

[3] *Actes de Philippe Auguste*, ii, no. 508.

[4] Ibid., no. 633. However, it did allow John to receive homage from the Count of Angoulême and the Vicomte of Limoges. It also allowed that Arthur should hold Brittany of John. The formal agreement on Anjou seems to have been made on John's subsequent visit to Paris (*Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, xviii. 295).

[5] *Actes de Philippe Auguste*, ii, no. 723.

allowed for the division of estates among heirs as part of family law. It did not permit any separation of Norman and French, or Norman and English estates on grounds of political convenience. There are some examples where this apparently occurred, either by exchange or at a succession. In the Pipe Roll of 1130 Arnold de Bosco offered 100 m. for land in Thorpe in return for surrendering Pailly in the castlery of Verneuil to the king.[1] In the late 1160s Henry II confirmed an agreement whereby Robert le Calceis conceded all the fee which he held of William of Roumare in England in return for William's demesne in Le Bourg-Dun and elsewhere.[2] In 1181–2 a division was made between the sons of Simon Count of Évreux whereby Amaury succeeded in Évreux and Simon in the lordship of Rochefort and other lands directly dependent on the King of France.[3] But such instances are on the whole unusual. Moreover, Norman families went on acquiring lands in France and English families land in Normandy. William de Mandeville Earl of Essex extended his Norman holdings by purchase.[4] So did Hugh de Lacy who was enfeoffed in the barony of Le Pin by Robert Count of Meulan.[5] When Richard I bestowed the marriage of the Giffard heiresses on Richard de Clare Earl of Hertford, and William Marshal in 1189, he divided both the Norman and the English estates between them with the proviso that the earl was to have the seniority in Normandy and the Marshal the seniority in England.[6] As late as 1200 a dispute between Henry de Tilly and William, his brother, on the partition of their inheritance led to a division of lands between them, both in England and in Normandy.[7] None of this revealed any serious lack of confidence in the future. Indeed there were examples where the consequences of war had been mitigated for landowners. When under the terms of the Treaty of Louviers of 1196 Richard de Vernon was forced to surrender Vernon to the French he was compensated by land in England and by the grant of a barony from the King of France.[8] The experience of generations was also a source of comfort. Many of these families

[1] *Pipe Roll 31 Henry I*, p. 88.
[2] *Actes de Henri II*, no. CCCCXXIX.
[3] Torigni, ii. 103.
[4] *Actes de Henri II*, no. DXLVII.
[5] Ibid., no. DCCVIII.
[6] *Cartae Antiquae Rolls 11–20* (Pipe Roll Society, N.S. xxxiii, 1957), no. 564.
[7] *Rot. Norm.*, pp. 7, 8, 41, 42.
[8] *Layettes du trésor des Chartes*, i, nos. 431, 441.

had lived with a dual fealty, to the French king for their French holdings and to the English king for their English and Norman holdings. Why should the transfer of the immediate lordship of Normandy alter this? It was easy to assume that the loss of Normandy to King John would not be a loss to them. That was one of the main reasons for the collapse. Normandy was not properly defended because there seemed to be no real need to do so. It was an assumption which Philip encouraged. After the victory he was ready to accept liege homage for Norman fiefs from those resident in England. It was John who dropped the barrier. When his men sought permission to perform homage to Philip for their Norman lands he refused. The scene provided one of the good stories of the day. John wished to take advice in the matter and consulted Baldwin of Béthune Count of Aumale. William was one of the few heroic figures of the war. Staunchly loyal to the Angevin cause he had served as a hostage for Richard in Germany. He had gained the Comté of Aumale by marriage as a reward, only to lose it when Aumale fell to the French in 1196. Now, crippled by arthritis, held up between two servants, he gave his view. The petitioners had told John that although their bodies might be with the King of France their hearts would be with him. 'Were I in your place', said Baldwin, 'if their bodies were against me and their hearts for me, if the hearts of those whose bodies were against me came into my hands I would throw them into the privy'.[1]

That seems to represent a turning-point, an acceptance that feudal loyalty could no longer be divided, that men had to choose between England and Normandy. But the story was recorded nearly twenty years later, after the battle of Bouvines and the civil war in England in which Prince Louis of France had claimed the English throne. Moreover, it came from a milieu where men were sensitively aware of conflicts of feudal loyalty. It was the same author who pilloried the tergiversations of Hugh de Gournay.[2] The biographer of William Marshal showed the same concern for loyalty and disdain for turncoats—the *tornés*.[3] Yet his hero was the outstanding example of those who sought to retain their interests on both sides of the Channel. He did it successfully and still became regent of England in 1216. It is not very easy to manufacture the birth of either the English

[1] *Histoire des ducs de Normandie*, p. 100.
[2] Ibid., p. 92.
[3] *Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal*, lines 12552–84.

or the French nation from the events of 1204. Afterwards, as before, Anglo-Norman monasteries held land on both sides of the Channel; so did some lay landowners; Rouen merchants still came to London, English scholars still went to Paris; and English magnates still went on the Crusade.[1] For some 1204 was just a stage and not even an irrevocable one. Some of those who had defected to Philip later returned to John's allegiance.[2]

In 1227 a citizen of Caen, R. Gaudin, sent a long, badly written intelligence report to Henry III of England. He had been listening to conversations between the son of the castellan of Caen and a clerk, Master Nicholas.[3] These two had gossiped at length about relations between the kings of England and France and the reasons for the loss of Normandy. They had then turned to the schemes which were afoot under the direction of the dowager Queen, Blanche of Castille, granddaughter of Henry II.

> She has it in mind to do what her lord wished to do and acquire England . . . and she intends to instruct the barons of Normandy to accompany her. If she succeeds she wishes them to have all their hereditary properties. She will tell the Earl of Chester and the Earl Bigod and the Earl Ferrers and lord Philip of Albini and lord William

[1] These matters have been discussed by Wendy B. Stevenson, 'England and Normandy 1204–1259', Ph.D. thesis, University of Leeds, 1974.

[2] Amaury, Count of Évreux returned to John's allegiance later in 1203 (*Rot. Norm.*, p. 110). Hugh de Gournay rejoined John in 1206 (*Rot. Litt. Pat.*, p. 57b). Ralph of Exoudun returned to John's favour in 1214 (ibid., p. 116).

[3] *Diplomatic Documents*, no. 206. This letter deserves more attention than it has received since its publication in England in 1964. Its information on the fall of Normandy seems authentic. It lists as John's errors the appointment of William le Gros as the last seneschal, the appointment of Louvrecaire to the custody of Falaise, and the consequent appearance of mercenaries in the interior rather than in the March, and finally the conduct of those mercenaries towards the Normans. This is all supported from other sources.

The conversation of the two Frenchmen is of some general interest. They commended the King of France for taking advice from a restricted group of members of the royal household—*two* only. The King of England, on the other hand, took advice and counsel from a large number, and thereby revealed his intentions. When the King of France sent to the papal curia he used a member of his household and got what he wanted. The King of England sent letters by the hand of a bishop, and the King of France would know all about it before he arrived in Rome.

Admittedly this seems to refer to the early years of Henry III, but it is in sharp contrast to the view stated by Gerald of Wales that the conflict was one between *libertatis hilaritas* (in France) and *servitutis oppressio* (in England) (*Opera*, viii. 258). These men saw it as a conflict, not between good and bad, but between the more and the less effective.

of St. John and all those who have claims to land in Normandy that they should join her and remain at her side on landing, and she will then persuade her son to restore their estates in Normandy. If the lord Louis had done this when he was in England he would have got control of the realm without opposition, because he had the aid and counsel of the best men of England.

The burgess went on to give his own advice to Henry: he was not to repeat his father's errors in Normandy in employing mercenary troops; if he wanted to reconquer Normandy then he was to inform all those Normans who had claims to land in England that their property would be restored. Indeed he was to retort in kind to the intentions of the French. It was now envisaged that those pressures which had earlier been applied across the Norman border should now be applied across the Channel. Apart from that, nothing had changed. The policies intended by Isabella and recommended to Henry III would not have seemed strange to Philip Augustus or Henry II.