DAWES HICKS LECTURE

THE GOOD SELF AND THE BAD SELF: THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BRITISH IDEALISM AND THE ENGLISH SCHOOL OF PSYCHOANALYSIS COMPARED

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SOME of you may think that in my choice of topic this evening I owe my distinguished predecessor in the chair of philosophy at University College London an apology. For the Dawes Hicks Lecture is a lecture in the history of philosophy, and the thought would be that in taking philosophy to include moral psychology I am obviously at fault for I have violated well-established frontiers. If I choose not to answer such a charge directly, one reason is this: that, rigidly delineated though such frontiers may be, the arguments in support of their being drawn as they are vary considerably. Another reason is that perhaps the best answer to the charge is the indirect answer: so that instead of disputing where the frontiers should run, one is more profitably engaged in showing how the existing lines may be safely transgressed, or, indeed, how in some historical phase progress was made in despite of them, which could not have been achieved if they had been held in respect. But if there is to be even the hope that the history of philosophy can in this way give anything to philosophy, it follows that it must not begin by borrowing from philosophy too rigid or exclusive a conception of what philosophy is. So I remain unapologetic in my choice of topic.

Idealism and psychoanalysis may seem an incongruous pair. The history of their transplantation to Britain is, it is true, in many ways a history of common experience. Originating in the German-speaking world, both encountered fierce opposition on arrival in this country. In the course of time both gained exponents, adherents, disciples, some of great distinction, but in neither case more than (comparatively) a few. And yet both have been held responsible for a wide range of nefarious consequences: intellectual, ethical, social, and practical. But this evening I want to draw your attention to another feature that transplanted idealism and transplanted psychoanalysis have in common. For if we look at the work of their most eminent

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representatives—and I shall confine myself to the ideas of F. H. Bradley and Melanie Klein—we can, I suggest, discern a joint contribution that they make to the understanding of moral phenomena: a contribution which at once belongs to moral psychology and justifies the claim of moral psychology to be a philosophical discipline.

II

Bradley's *Ethical Studies* is divided into seven essays. Too many readers of the book—barely a class with a superfluity of members—hasten to identify Bradley's own ethical views with the heavily collectivist theory which he expounds in Essay V under the Hegelian heading, 'My Station and its Duties'. They do this, despite the fact that in the very first sentence of the next essay Bradley says of this theory that 'however true'—which is his way of saying 'however many truths it may contain'—it provides 'no sufficient answer to the question What is Morality?'[1] This remark, however, is lost on them for by this time they have brought their reading of Bradley to a close and shut the book.

Such precipitance on the reader's part is unfortunate, and unfortunate for two reasons, which are connected. Already in Essay II Bradley had introduced his own ethical theory. 'The final end', he had written there, 'with which morality is identified, or under which it is included, can be expressed not otherwise than by self-realization'.[2] But it is not until Essay VII that a full-scale account of the theory of self-realization is given, and by stopping short where he does the precipitate reader deprives himself of this. But he also deprives himself of a proper understanding of Bradley's criticisms of alternative ethical theories, given in Essays III and IV, which he will have already read, and is certain to have admired. And the connection is this: that in criticizing Hedonistic theory and Deontological theory Bradley concentrates on the account that each theory provides of moral action, and why moral action, and therefore an adequate account of it, are of supreme importance to ethical theory, becomes fully clear if, and is not obvious unless, one entertains, if not assertorically at least hypothetically, the theory of self-realization.

Indeed this last point, as an observation on Bradley's procedure, could be expressed more forcefully. For it would be little

[1] F. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies* (Oxford, 2nd edn. 1927), p. 214.
[2] Ibid., p. 81.

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exaggeration to say that in criticizing the theory of Pleasure for Pleasure's Sake or the theory of Duty for Duty's Sake—as he calls them—Bradley in effect criticizes each not so much as an ethical theory in its own right but rather as an interpretation of the theory of self-realization. Now if this is so, it follows that the crucial question that Bradley has to ask of each theory is, Does it properly exhibit moral action as self-realization?

Should we now wonder why Bradley proceeds in this way, the answer would seem to lie in something that he says in the course of introducing his own theory. He was, he conceded, in no position, metaphysically that is, to prove the theory. And he went on, 'All that we can do is partially to explain it, and try to render it plausible.'[1] The partial explanation unfolds in two stages. The first stage consists in looking at what can be gathered from alternative ethical theories—or, more strictly, from the accounts of moral action that they provide—about self-realization, and thus seeing what there is that remains to be said. And the second stage consists in the appeal to moral psychology. And as for rendering his theory plausible, Bradley's hope is that plausibility will attach to the theory as the explanation unfolds.

If we make our start with Bradley's criticisms of alternative theory, a preliminary is to recognize the requirement that he places upon an account of moral action: a requirement which derives from the view that he takes of action in general. For Bradley all action is intentional in a fairly strong sense in that we cannot be said to *do* anything that we did not intend to do: though, of course, our actions may fall short of our intentions—we may not do what we intended to do. So, if, for instance, moral action is, as Bradley maintains, self-realization, what it is not is, amongst other things, action in which the self is realized fortuitously or coincidentally. There must be some corresponding idea or set of ideas under which the action was done. It follows from this that, if an ethical theory is to attain to adequacy, it must provide an account of moral action that assigns to it the appropriate intentionality: or, to use language that is peculiarly appropriate to Bradley's thinking, the theory must capture the volitional structure of moral action.

So the first question to be asked is, Does Hedonism do this? Now, according to Bradley it is characteristic of authentic Hedonistic theory—that is, theory at once consistent and consistently Hedonistic, of which he thought that, avowals to the contrary, there was precious little around—that it presents

[1] Ibid., p. 65.

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the moral agent thus: that on each and every occasion that he acts morally, he wills some particular pleasure. He wills, in other words (the gloss is Bradley's, and we shall see its significance), 'a state of the feeling self'.[1] If such a man's will is invariably actualized, it follows that his existence will unfold as a succession of pleasurable states. Now, if we ask whether such a succession amounts to self-realization, the answer must depend on the relations between the various pleasurable states—whether, that is, they fit together into, or form, a pattern or whole: and since there is nothing in the Hedonistic account of what the man wills that corresponds to such an outcome, that account as an account of moral action must be defective. For it to be adequate to the intentionality of moral action it must ascribe to the moral agent not only the idea of this or that particular end but also some general standing idea under which he wills the end he does.

If Hedonistic theory is thus deficient, the second question to be asked is, Does Deontological theory show us how to repair this deficiency? According to Bradley it is characteristic of this theory that it presents the moral agent thus: that on each and every occasion that he acts morally, he wills to act under one and the same idea which is also of the greatest generality. The idea under which he wills may be called—'indifferently' Bradley says[2]—Freedom, Universality, Autonomy, or the Formal Will. But the trouble with this idea, it would seem, is that, in any of its guises, it goes too far—it goes all the way, we might say—in the direction of generality. Bradley characterizes it as 'mere universal', and what he means by this might be put by saying that the agent may quite properly be said to be able to will anything under it, alternatively to will nothing under it. Anything: in that any particular end is compatible with it. Nothing: in that no particular end is indicated by it. If what is wrong with Hedonism is that, if the moral agent wills as the account it provides specifies, and his will is actualized, he will not necessarily achieve self-realization, what is wrong with Deontological theory is that, if the agent wills as the account it provides specifies, there is no clear sense that can be given to supposing that his will is or indeed could be actualized. Of no one particular action rather than another can it be said, as needs to be said, that *it* matches his intention.

However, to put the matter so might suggest that, at any

[1] Ibid., p. 94.
[2] Ibid., p. 144.

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rate on the present showing, Hedonistic theory has for Bradley a start over Deontological theory as an interpretation of the theory of self-realization. For, whatever else self-realization may be, it is surely action—it is, in Bradley's words, a 'doing',[1] a 'putting forth'[2]—and, this being so, must it not be for him a relative merit of Hedonistic theory that it assigns to the moral agent a volitional structure from which some kind of action could follow, and, equally, a relative demerit of Deontological theory that from the volitional structure it assigns him no action could conceivably follow? But Bradley does not think like this. He does not allow Hedonistic theory even a temporary advantage over Deontological theory, and we must try to see why. It is certainly true that Hedonistic theory assigns to the moral agent an intentionality from which action could ensue, but Bradley's point is the action that ensues or would ensue is quite improperly related—improperly, that is, from the point of view of a theory of moral action—to that intentionality. It is related as means to end, so that, for instance, if a better means were found to the same end, that should be preferred as a way of realizing that intention. But it is a requirement on moral action not only (as we have seen) that the action should not be fortuitous, that is that there should be an intention, but also that the action should not be merely instrumentally related to the intention: the end should be realized not merely through the action but in the action. But, if the end is, as Hedonistic theory would have it, a particular state of the feeling self—just that—this requirement cannot, in the nature of that end, be satisfied. So, to adapt a distinction of Bradley's: at best Hedonistic theory could offer an ethic of self-realizedness, not—which is what we are after—an ethic of self-realization.

A good and natural way of expressing Bradley's criticisms of these alternative theories would be to say that each theory is one-sided. And this is just what Bradley says.[3] But when he says it, he wants the phrase to be taken—well, if not literally, then at any rate as a living, rather than as a dead, metaphor. For it is for Bradley a truth, a theoretical truth, about volition that it has two 'sides', a universal side and a particular side,[4] a truth which he thinks is displayed in, or which we can grasp through, the very form of the assertion 'I will this or that', for in saying

[1] Ibid., p. 65.
[2] Ibid., pp. 66, 267.
[3] Ibid., p. 142.
[4] Ibid., pp. 72–3.

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this we mean (and I quote) 'to distinguish the self, as will in general, from this or that object of desire'.[1] Accordingly, a theory which is to go beyond Hedonistic theory and Deontological theory must afford full recognition to both sides of moral volition, and in doing so it must, of course, repair those injustices which each side has suffered from the theory that recognizes it exclusively. And then it must do something which in the nature of the case neither of the alternative theories could even attempt: it must exhibit how in moral action the two sides are brought into relation. It is just this additional task that I had in mind when I talked of the appositeness of the phrase 'volitional structure' to Bradley's form of ethical inquiry.

What Bradley has then to do for his ethical theory is to show what the particular end is in moral volition, what the self is in moral volition, and how it is that the two are brought into conjunction so that the latter realizes itself in willing the former. It is in pursuit of such an account that Bradley turns away from existing ethical theory to psychology, and we thus enter upon the second stage in his partial explanation of what he regards as true ethical theory. The two stages are related thus: that, having gained from alternative philosophical theory the general form of moral volition, Bradley looks to psychology to inform him about its content, and when he has, as it were, placed one inside the other, he will then be able to say what the volitional structure of moral action is. He will still not have proved his ethical theory but he may have made it seem more plausible against our moral intuitions, and, in doing so, he will, with luck, have sharpened them.

III

Bradley's appeal to psychology starts not with the complex phenomenon of moral action but with about the simplest type of action that can be said to have a volitional structure. Its simplicity Bradley takes as showing that it possesses not only logical priority, but also temporal priority in the history of the individual. His name for it is 'appetite', and his account, which is to be found in Essay VII of *Ethical Studies*, 'Selfishness and Self-Sacrifice', runs as follows:

An agent perceives a sensuous thing, which he subsumes under one idea or more. His condition is such that the idea of this thing, or perhaps better, the idea of having the thing, arouses in him a complex of feelings. On the one hand, he experiences a painful

[1] Ibid., p. 71.

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feeling, connected with the fact that he does not have, or that he lacks, the thing—a feeling which may, or may not, be a continuation of existent want. On the other hand, he experiences a pleasurable feeling, because the having of the thing is somehow connected for him with satisfaction. The two feelings, pain and pleasure, set up a tension, and the felt tension, otherwise called desire, moves the agent to have the thing.[1] An example: A small child sees and recognizes a lump of sugar. His condition is such that the thought of not having the sugar excites in him feelings of hunger. And it is also such that the thought of having the sugar excites in him feelings that would accompany his eating sugar. The first experience is painful, the second pleasurable, and the conjunction leads him to reach out a hand for the sugar or to cry for it.

If we now ask what the content of the volitional structure is in this case, we get this answer: The particular side, or end, is represented by the idea of the sensuous thing. The universal side or self is represented by the pleasure that is excited by the idea of the thing and that moves the agent towards the thing itself. And the two sides are related through physical want.

An instant way of bringing this account into focus, or of holding it steady, is to concentrate on the role it assigns to pleasure, and then to contrast this with the role that pleasure has assigned to it in a typically Hedonistic account of action. What does this allow us to see? In the first place, on the present account pleasure does not appear at all on the particular side, which in the Hedonistic account it monopolizes: what is willed is now willed under the idea of a particular thing, not of a particular pleasure. And, secondly, where pleasure does appear on this account—that is, on the universal side—it is pleasure itself that appears there, not the idea of pleasure, which is all that the Hedonistic account lets in: this, according to Bradley, must be right, for, at any rate in the ordinary kind of case, it is only feeling, of which pleasure, as we have seen, is an instance, that can move to action.

From this last point it would seem to follow that in any account of action—in other words, in an account of even the most complex type of action—the self, or universal side to volition, will in part at least be represented by pleasure. And this is indeed Bradley's position. What is distinctive about the account of appetite is that the pleasure to which it makes reference is of so peculiarly primitive a kind. But that only records—

[1] Ibid., pp. 263–8.

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though it does not exhaust—the fact that the type of self that appetite presupposes is itself a primitive type of self: a fact that Bradley brings out when he says, as he does repeatedly, that in appetite the self 'affirms' itself—affirms, that is, not 'realizes', itself.

Now, I would contend that it is prima facie a strength of Bradley's account of action and its volitional structure that, even on its lowest level, it accommodates some form of self: just as I would also add, parenthetically this time, that it is prima facie an advantage for any developmental psychology, like, say, psychoanalytic theory, if it can postulate, from even the earliest stages of mental life, an ego however rudimentary.[1] But I say prima facie in both cases: for this lead can be maintained only if a further, genetic thesis is provided, itself involving only perspicuous transitions, showing how what is presumed present from the beginning evolves into its final, complex form. And it would be my claim that out of what Bradley has to say in the original text of *Ethical Studies* and in the additional material appended nearly fifty years later in 1924, can be reconstructed just such a genetic thesis, taking one from the primitive self that affirms itself in appetite to the good self that realizes itself in moral action.

Ostensibly what Bradley does is to provide a systematic account of different types of action, in which each type is more complex than its predecessor, and where difference in type of action is paired off with difference in type of object of volition. He produces what may be thought of as a hierarchy either of action or of object of volition. However, in doing this Bradley also provides, I claim, a genetic thesis about the self, because at each new level in the hierarchy, it becomes apparent that a new and more evolved type of self is required into being if the particular and the universal sides of volition are to engage with one another. And this genetic thesis reveals its adequacy for his moral theory in that the most evolved type of self it posits, or the self at the very top of the hierarchy, can reasonably be thought of as realizing itself in willing the most complex object of volition.

But to understand this account we must first grasp what is meant by a type, or, more significantly, by different types, of object of volition. Clearly this is not the same as different objects

[1] This is to be taken as the first substantive reference in this lecture to the work of Melanie Klein, with which it will later engage: and the relevant contrast here is with the work of Anna Freud and, on a more sophisticated level, with that of Margaret Mahler and her co-workers.

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of volition—presumably the object is of the same type when now I will a plate of smoked salmon as when in childhood I willed a lump of sugar. A reasonable suggestion, seemingly in line with Bradley's thinking, is that we can talk of not just different objects of volition, but different types of object, when and only when there are different objects, and, furthermore, in having—equally in lacking—one of these objects the agent would stand in a quite different relationship to it from what he would stand in to the other, if he had or lacked that: where the terms 'object of volition', 'have', and 'lack' are all used quite schematically and as mutual correlatives.

So: in the case of appetite to have the object of volition is—at any rate approximately—to gain physical mastery over it or to consume it: to lack it is for it to be beyond one's reach. That exemplifies one relationship to the object of volition. But now consider the following sequence of possible ends that an agent might adopt as the object of his volition: one, the presence or proximity of a loved figure in the environment; two, the state of satisfaction or happiness of such a figure; three, conforming to, or ultimately, four, the adoption of, that figure's will and character. If we consider this sequence, it should be apparent that as an agent progressed through it, acquiring new ends, then at each point in the sequence the relationship in which he stood to the object of his volition—stood to it, that is, either in having it or in lacking it—would radically alter; and in describing the agent's movement through this sequence as a 'progression' I have in mind the further, and I hope no less apparent, fact that the relationship of agent to object, as it altered, would also become increasingly more abstractly identified. The pattern that realizes it must be characterized on an even higher level of generality. And it is this that warranted my saying of Bradley that he produces not merely a list of different types of object of volition or a list of different types of action, but a hierarchy. For, of course, readers of Bradley will have recognized, and others of you may have suspected, that the sequence of ends I enumerated just now—the presence of another, the welfare of another, obedience to another, the will of another—was not selected by me at random but corresponds to what Bradley thinks is willed by the agent as he engages in increasingly complex types of action. They are the objects of volition that the appetitive child progressively makes his own.

This being so, we can already see one line of determination along which more complex types of action might be thought to

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require into being more evolved types of self. For each new type of action requires a self that can form—and, we might add, maintain—a more and more abstract view of what counts as the success, alternatively as the failure, of his will. On the universal side of volition there must be, we might think, some representation of mounting complexity that attaches to the realization of the particular side.

But, if this were so, it would, of course, all lie in the cognitive domain, and it would contribute only to a genetic thesis about a self that emerges or develops intellectually. And the cognitive plays no part, or next to none, in Bradley's moral psychology at least at this stage. The development of the self in which Bradley is specifically interested falls within the emotional domain, and it derives from the way in which, according to him, different types of object of volition, and therefore different types of action, make new demands upon the feelings and desires of the child: more precisely, from the way in which they enlarge his capacity to experience pleasure and pain. And in this connection we may note two distinct, though clearly interrelated, lines of determination.

It would be true, and I hope informative, to say of appetite that the child experiences pleasure in having the lump of sugar only when he wants the sugar and then only because he wants the sugar. Let us now look at these two conditions in perhaps artificial separation. So: 'Only *when* he wants the sugar'—that is, the child takes no pleasure in the object as such: it is for him neither permanently nor independently pleasant.[1] 'And then only *because* he wants the sugar'—that is, the pleasure that the child experiences when he does is always in contrast to some pain that he simultaneously or, more likely, antecedently, experiences. The pleasure—and it is a favoured phrase of Bradley's—the pleasure is 'felt against'[2] the felt absence of the object of appetite. It is then in both these respects that, as the child comes to engage in new types of action, his capacity to experience pleasure (and pain) in relation to the object of volition develops: and this development is in turn crucial for—indeed one might say partly constitutive of—the emergence of the self.

First, then, the child extends the range of objects in which he may take pleasure. And, if I have already indicated how this goes, I should now fill in the detail. It goes, then, from the

[1] Bradley remarks wrily, 'It is not pleasant to live in the public room of an inn where eating goes on all day.' Op. cit., p. 268.

[2] Ibid., pp. 266, 267, 283 n.

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transient thing that will satisfy appetite, to the same thing conceived of as an enduring object, to a loved person who is always with the child, to the well-being or happiness of such a person, to that person's will or set of precepts, and finally to persons and causes with which the child is not personally involved. At each stage—Bradley is at pains to point out—the extension of what is found pleasant is based firmly on the previous stage. So consider the all-important extension from an object that habitually satisfies appetite to the satisfaction or happiness of a person in the environment. What ensures this transition, according to Bradley, is that there are persons in the environment who are already linked with the habitual satisfaction of the child's appetites. It is, he says, 'a fact which deserves more attention than it receives'[1] that the first figures to whom the child is permanently attached are those who have satisfied his first recurring wants and are a fixed aspect of the environment. And he specifies mother and nurse.

Bradley is anxious that the growth of 'interest'—as he calls it, following Hegel—should be safe against two fairly ready misinterpretations. It is not the case, he insists, that this process depends—as some eighteenth-century moralists would have us think—on the workings of sympathy: so that the child's pleasure is caused by another's pleasure through the intervention of associated ideas, first of the other's pleasure, then of the child's. For apart from the question whether such a mechanism could indeed account for the result required of it, appeal to it denies the basic fact that the child's pleasure in new objects is as direct as any it received from satisfied appetite. But nor is it the case, Bradley also insists, that the child simply remains confined to the pleasure of satisfied appetite, and that its interest in other people, their happiness, their injunctions, their aims, is no more than a cultivation of these various things as means to a pleasure distinct from them.

Bradley's own account of the extension of interest is in terms of objectified feeling. So an object excites pleasure in a child, and he then comes to invest this object with that feeling, so that from then onwards he experiences the object in much the same way as up till then he had experienced his sensations of satisfied appetite. He feels it 'as part of himself':[2] or again, without it he 'does not "feel his self" at all'.[3] And the point is illustrated,

[1] Ibid., p. 284.
[2] Ibid., p. 284.
[3] Ibid., p. 282.

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in a way that may remind us of later theory, thus: 'The breast of his mother, and the soft warmth and touches and tones of his nurse, are made one with the feeling of his own pleasure and pain.'[1] If, Bradley maintains, an explanation of this process is still demanded in terms of ideas and their vicissitudes, then we should think not that the ideas of the object and my pleasant feelings are associated, but that the two ideas are integrated or become one: though Bradley might have been wise to point out that this is not so much an explanation, as a consequence or register, of the objectification of feeling.

So much for the first way in which, as the child comes to engage in new types of action, his capacity to experience pleasure and pain in relation to the object of volition develops. Interest enlarges, or the range of object in relation to which he experiences direct pleasure extends beyond that which satisfies transient appetite.

Secondly, as this occurs, the pleasure that the child experiences in the object is no longer felt against, or is no longer felt exclusively against, pain. There are three considerations relevant here, for two of which we have already been prepared. The first is that, as we move up the scale of action, the requirement to find a place for pain in the account of volition weakens. When to have the object of volition means, as in appetite, to possess it physically, then the equation of lacking the object with being deprived of it or the sense of privation, which is painful, is plausible. But as having the object is increasingly a matter first of doing something or other, and then of being something or other, the equation loses plausibility. And at the same time—and this is the second consideration—the child is increasingly drawn to the object for its own sake, so that he takes pleasure in it because of what it is, and permanently is, rather than, as in appetite, because of how he is and transiently is. But the third consideration is the most important. And that is that, as the scope of interest enlarges, as feeling comes to be widely objectified, as the significance of the object becomes increasingly independent of the child's immediate state, so the relevant background to any single action of his lengthens, so that it now takes in not just the fact that here and now he lacks the object of volition but also the fact that on repeated occasions in the past he has had the object. Past satisfactions are now stored: for it is no longer the case that satisfaction endures only until want returns, but it is somehow laid down in external achievement or internally in

[1] Ibid., p. 172.

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the form of character and habits, and thus realized is perpetually pleasant. 'The child', Bradley says, 'has done something; and what he has done he still in some shape or other has, if it be only in credit; he possesses an objective issue of his will, and in that not only did realize himself, but does perpetually have himself realized.'[1]

IV

This last quotation might suggest that, in Bradley's eyes, we have now reached a self of the relevant complexity that, insert it on to the universal side of a volitional structure, see that an appropriate end occupies the particular side, and we can think of the ensuing action as self-realization. However, it is his view that, before this can be seen to be correct, we must add to the account of the self—to the account of the self, I say, rather than to the self, for it may be that a self that will satisfy the account thus far given, will satisfy the rest—two further stipulations. The first is that there should be knowledge of good and evil and the corresponding capacity to will each as such. And the second is the division of the self into the good self and the bad self. The two conditions, or the processes that lead up to them, for each is the product of slow growth, are intimately connected.

'The existence of two selves in a man', Bradley writes, 'is a fact which is too plain to be denied.'[2] Two selves, note, aiming respectively at the good and the bad, and not just two collections of desires, some of which we happen to think good and the others bad. In the beginning, however, these two selves are represented in the young child by something like two centres of pleasure, of which one is under the influence of the extension of interest, while the other is not. Given the role of pleasure in volition—and we have seen something of this—the consequences of there being two such centres within the child should be discernible. Not only will he act upon different desires at different times, not only will action upon these different desires establish within him different habits, but at these different times the world will seem to him so different that it will not occur to him to will otherwise than as he does. And at times the two centres can be so brought into conjunction that the world will seem to him these two different ways at one and the same time.

A crucial stage, however, in the development of the two selves out of the two centres of pleasure is reached when interest has

[1] Ibid., p. 289.
[2] Ibid., p. 276.

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grown to the point when the precepts and prohibitions—the will, in other words—of a loved figure become the object of the child's volition. This stage is crucial for two reasons.

In the first place, the conflict between the two sets of desires, issuing from the two centres, always active, now becomes sharpened: and that is because one set is now experienced as conforming to, whereas the other set is recognized as contravening, this will. And the conflict is then further sharpened as the will, originally, of course, encountered as external, or as 'the will of the superior', in Bradley's words 'ceases to be external and becomes autonomy'.[1] And, secondly, it is at this stage, and not coincidentally, that the child acquires knowledge of good and evil, and, once the knowledge has been acquired, good and evil are then appropriated by the centres, so that each centre has now a distinctive and unified way of expressing its aim. So, to put the two reasons together, not only is the conflict between the two sets of desire accentuated, it now gains a new self-consciousness.

I said that it was not coincidental that it was at this stage, as internal conflict grows, that Bradley thought that the child acquired knowledge of good and evil. What I had in mind was Bradley's insistence that good and bad can never be known, nor ideas of them acquired, from something purely external. The modern absurdity of 'moral education', which occupies some contemporary philosophers of morals and of education, finds no place in his thinking. 'Knowledge of morality', Bradley insists,

> is knowledge of specific forms of the will, and, just as will can be known only because we know our will, so these forms of will demand personal and immediate knowledge. Hatred of evil means feeling of evil, and you can not be brought to feel what is not inside you, or has nothing analogous within you. Moral perception must rest on moral experience.[2]

The relevance of this important idea in the present context is this: that, if, initially, the division of the self into a good self and a bad self is facilitated by the child's learning of good and evil, under which ideas the two selves can then organize themselves, nevertheless, once this knowledge has been acquired, facilitation will occur in the other direction. The child's knowledge of good and evil will be further deepened by the felt division of the self into good and bad, and by the recurrent experience of internal conflict:

[1] Ibid., p. 301.
[2] Ibid., p. 298.

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It will not do for the subject merely to be identified with good on the one side, bad on the other, to perceive their incompatibility and feel their discrepancy. He cannot know them unless he knows them against each other.[1]

V

There are two distinct parts of Melanie Klein's theory that contribute to our understanding of morality, and these also, I wish to suggest, by conforming to Bradley's moral psychology go some way to underpinning it: these are the account of internal objects, and the account of the depressive position. In arguing for their relevance to Bradleian theory I shall consider the two accounts in turn.

In discussing Bradley's ideas I made no attempt to relate British Idealism to the philosophy of Hegel. Similarly in discussing Mrs. Klein's ideas I shall not attempt the hotly debated question precisely how the English school of Psychoanalysis relates to Freud's own theory—though it is my own conviction, which I shall therefore state baldly, that one is the proper continuation of the other. But, however the question is to be decided in general, it is clear that the Kleinian account of internal objects takes off from certain hypotheses of Freud's about the development of the ego, initially put forward in two of his greatest papers, 'On Narcissism' and 'Mourning and Melancholia',[2] and then more systematically presented in *Group Psychology and the Ego*.[3] So: in order to explain internal objects and their formation Mrs. Klein invoked just what Freud had invoked to explain the watching, measuring, criticizing agency that occupied him in the Narcissism paper and also the lost love-object incorporated in the ego which he thought to be at the base of melancholia. In both cases appeal is made, on the one hand, to the appropriate developmental state of the instincts, including anxiety, and, on the other hand, to a few psychic mechanisms, of which clearly the most relevant is introjection. And, as these examples suggest, the strength of the explanation must lie, in part, in the wide range of phenomena it can account for, from the case where a bad object is taken in defensively, so as to ward off anxiety, to that where a good object is taken in constructively, so as to strengthen or extend mental structure.

[1] Ibid.

[2] Sigmund Freud, *Complete Psychological Works*, ed. James Strachey, etc. (London, 1953–74), vol. xiv.

[3] Ibid., vol. xviii.

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One significant respect in which Mrs. Klein goes beyond what Freud explicitly asserts, though not beyond what he suggests, is in what she has to say about how the various psychic mechanisms operate, or in what mental activity their functioning consists, and her view is that in each case their functioning consists in phantasy.[1] More precisely it consists in phantasy twice over. For—suppose we concentrate on introjection—then the initial incorporative process can be identified with a phantasy of ingesting the object through the contemporaneously dominant bodily zone or channel: say the mouth, or possibly the anus. And, then as a consequence of this initial phantasy there is set up in the mind of the person who has entertained it a disposition to entertain further phantasies in which a counterpart object to the object internalized—an internal object—is represented as being —that is, as living or dying—inside one.

If it is now asked how this mental activity, phantasy, is to be understood, the suggestion most in keeping with Kleinian theory is that it should be understood as a piece, occurrent or dispositional, of imaginative activity, normally unconscious, and engaged in (and this we shall see is important) under a belief in the omnipotence of thoughts. Elsewhere I have argued for this interpretation,[2] but this evening I wish only to indicate a particular advantage that it has for us. And that is that it can account for a distinction, of general importance for psychoanalytic theory, but peculiarly relevant for our concerns, between two types of introjection.[3] One, which is identification, concludes with the internal object represented as within, or part of, the self: the other, which might be called mere internalization, concludes with the internal object represented as over and against the self; and my suggestion about the nature of phantasy would then explain this distinction by reference to a difference, phenomenologically accessible, between two kinds of imaginative activity—that is, between the case where one imagines someone else 'from the inside', or one imagines him centrally, and the case where one imagines oneself centrally and someone else from the outside, or one imagines him peripherally. For, within the dispositional piece of phantasy, which is relevant here, one could then pair off

[1] e.g. *The Writings of Melanie Klein*, ed. Roger Money-Kyrle, etc. (London, 1975–), vol. i, p. 291.

[2] Richard Wollheim, 'Identification and Imagination', in *Freud: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Richard Wollheim (New York, 1974).

[3] Perhaps the most thorough and systematic discussion of these distinctions is to be found in Roy Schafer, *Aspects of Internalization* (New York, 1968).

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identification with imagining someone else centrally, and mere internalization with imagining someone else peripherally.[1]

But let me explain what I meant by saying that the distinction within introjection is peculiarly relevant for our concerns. I meant that the Bradleian account of the development of the moral self out of a more primitive self seems to presuppose something very like identification, and once we have the structure of this mechanism reasonably straight, then we can, by appending it to that account, make that account at once clearer and stronger.

The first and most obvious place where identification fits on to the Bradleian account is in connection with the growth of 'interest'. (And it is noteworthy, though no more than that, that Bradley himself makes much use of the term 'identification' in connection with the extension of interest.) For recall that Bradley rules out two possible interpretations of this process: one is that the child engages in some complex piece of ratiocination in which he puts himself in another's place so that then pleasure will accrue to him, the other that he remains incorrigibly selfish and attends to another's pleasure but only to ensure, consequentially, his own. And perhaps we can see how identification, interpreted as I have suggested, is well calculated both to bring about the requisite result and to do so without mediation. For it will ordinarily be the case—that is, outside phantasy—that the child, by centrally imagining someone else, will, if he feels anything, feel what the person whom he imagines would, or would be believed to, feel. If the child felt otherwise, this would destroy the centrality of that person in his imagination. And what phantasy adds to this ordinary linkage, is that, by requiring that the imaginative activity is engaged in under the belief in the omnipotence of thoughts, it ensures that the child feels something. He will feel something, that is, unless he is too psychically damaged to feel at all: and then we would think of him as also too damaged to phantasize. And if he does feel what the person whom he centrally imagines would feel, his emotional range will enlarge.

My suggestion then is that one part of Kleinian theory—the theory of internal objects—allows us a better insight into a phenomenon vital to the development of the self—the extension of interest—which Bradleian moral psychology merely asserts.[2]

[1] Richard Wollheim, op. cit.

[2] This is not, of course, literally true. But in this lecture I have deliberately left out of account whatever advantage Bradley's moral theory seeks to derive from the metaphysical view that humanity is a concrete universal or that

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But probably other psychological theories or fragments of such theories could do this, and therefore how strong a claim to relevance Kleinian theory can make must depend on the extent to which in explaining one aspect of Bradleian moral psychology it can also explain others.

Now, if within Bradleian moral psychology the emergent self characteristically comes to seek pleasure in new ends, or rather new types of end, it is no less characteristic of it that, as it finds the pleasure that it seeks, it ceases to feel this exclusively or even predominantly 'against' pain. And this, as we have seen, for three reasons: the pain of privation becomes less in evidence; the pleasure in the object gains in intrinsicality; and past pleasures are now somehow stored in the self and perpetually available to it. And my next suggestion is that this aspect too of the development of the self finds an explanation in the Kleinian account of internal objects, though the explanation it offers requires us to adjust somewhat our over-all view of the matter.

For, let us first note that the new relations between pain and pleasure that Bradley writes of seem to correspond very closely to a certain constellation of emotional attitudes and capacities that Mrs. Klein identifies as the diminution of frustration, the increasing capacity for good experiences, and—most significant in her view—the growing security that the child derives from its knowledge of past satisfactions. And this constellation she not only associates with, but also hopes to explain by reference to, the stable establishment within the ego of a good internal object. And, if we wonder why this should be so, why lasting identification should bring in train these benign consequences, the answer in part rests with what it is that on Kleinian theory is introjected. For the object in the external world that is taken in in phantasy is not simply that which transiently gratifies the infant's appetite, it is, rather, the permanent source of that which gratifies appetite. In the most archaic (and therefore the most significant) case, it is not milk that the infant introjects: it is the breast.

But, if it is true that the account of internal objects can be used to explain both the growth in interest and the new relations between pleasure and pain, what is also true—and this is what I meant by an adjustment to our over-all view of the matter—is that in explaining both phenomena the account establishes what had so far been lacking: this is, a priority between them. For the new relations between pleasure and pain now take precedence,

the individual self is properly seen as part of a larger whole from which it is a mere abstraction. I do not regret this omission.

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structurally and hence temporally, over the growth in interest. And this is so because, whereas the new relations between pleasure and pain derive from the mere establishment of the internal object, or from the initiating part of the phantasy, the growth of interest derives from the ongoing part of the phantasy, or from the relations with—that is, the relations in phantasy with—the internal objects.

But it is now time for us to take a closer look at the initiating phantasy itself: the phantasy of incorporation. For that phantasy reflects or represents what in my reconstruction of Bradley I called a particular kind of object of volition: and the point I want to make now is that the phantasy of incorporation represents a fairly primitive kind of action in that the whole associated pattern of what it is to have, and what it is not to have, the object of volition is rudimentarily conceived. It is not the most primitive kind of action, such that having the related object is equated with consuming it, for some objectification of feeling would appear to have occurred. (What is introjected is not milk, but the breast.) Nevertheless it falls within the stage of appetite, and this allows me to make my next point: and that is that the Kleinian account of internal objects provides us with a smooth uninterrupted sequence of events, which starts in a primitive type of action, goes through the incorporative phantasy modelled on this type of action, through the constellation of feelings that this phantasy sets up, through the ongoing phantasy in which the introjected object makes its appearance, through the growth of interest that this ongoing phantasy then permits, and closes on new and more evolved types of action in which the child transcends appetite. In other words, on just one assumption Kleinian theory strings together into a single perspicuous story events that Bradleian moral psychology also insists, though without indicating how, must be connected by only easy or natural transitions. And the one assumption that Kleinian theory makes, which is, of course, totally unrealistic in the short run, but reasonable on a longer term, is that regression does not occur, and it is certainly worth any curious reader's while to observe how close in spirit are what the two theories have to say about how such disturbance or inhibition may occur. What Bradley refers to as Lust—an 'unfortunate' term, he later admitted,[1] meaning, I suppose, totally misleading—and what Mrs. Klein refers to as Envy, are both essentially rooted in insatiability, and their phenomenology is described in surprisingly similar terms.

[1] Bradley, op. cit., p. 269 n.

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And now in relating Kleinian theory to Bradleian moral psychology, I have allowed the account of internal objects to overrun that of the depressive position, to which I now turn.[1] In broad outline the depressive position arises when the infant comes to perceive that the good and bad objects with which it has felt itself to be surrounded are really only part-objects or aspects of one and the same thing which therefore has at different times been loved or hated. In venting its rage upon the hated mother the child has in reality or (worse) in omnipotent phantasy damaged the mother it loves. Two broad possibilities are open to it. On the one hand, the infant may be unable to tolerate the perception, and then resorts to such crude mechanisms as splitting or denial, or alternatively to the manic defence. On the other hand, it may be able to accept the perception, and then under the influence of guilt or depressive (as opposed to persecutory) anxiety it will struggle to repair, preserve, or revive the loved injured object. And 'loved injured object' here covers both external and internal objects: for as the child's perception of the external world is corrected to take in whole objects, the inner world is correspondingly modified in its representation. Now, in claiming that the growth of interest, and in consequence the capacity to engage in new types of action, can be explained in terms of the infant's relations with its internal objects, I must be understood as referring to those relations only in so far as they are motivated by the emotions and anxieties characteristic of the depressive position. And in order to grasp the full contribution of the depressive position to the growth of the moral life, one must further appreciate that some of the reparative activity in which the infant engages will be of a symbolical character: that is to say, it will express itself in external creativity and achievement, and, internally, in trying to reclaim lost or split-off parts of the self, and to harmonize the desires with which the infant can readily feel simply assailed. The ego, no longer preoccupied with preserving itself, can attempt to integrate itself.

VI

Certainly the most striking feature in common between the moral psychology of Bradley and that of Mrs. Klein is their connection of the good, or the idea of the good, with harmony or

[1] The formulation of the depressive position and the contrast between depressive and persecutory anxiety is first given in 'Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States' to be found in *The Writings of Melanie Klein*, vol. i.

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unity, and when, now sixteen years ago, I wrote a book on the philosophy of Bradley this was the only point of comparison that I made.[1] In favour of this connection, and of the associated view that the bad is primarily directed against the good, and the bad is deficient in harmony or unity, all of which might conveniently, though perhaps not all that precisely, be summarized as the thesis of the dependence of the bad upon the good, our two thinkers have, of course, very different arguments; very different considerations weigh with them; and instead of enumerating and correlating these arguments—which would require another lecture to itself—I shall just make certain rather general observations about the thesis that they are designed to support.

First, let me make clear, in case it is not so already, that the thesis is not necessarily a bland or optimistic thesis. Mrs. Klein, for instance, combined a belief in the dependence of the bad on the good with the attribution to the child of phantasies quite incompatible with the sweet and repressive myth of early innocence. Writing of the first few months of life, she describes the situation thus:

> In its oral-sadistic phantasies the child attacks its mother's breast, and the means it employs are its teeth and jaws. In its urethral and anal phantasies it seeks to destroy the inside of the mother's body, and uses its urine and faeces for this purpose. In this second group of phantasies the excrements are regarded as burning and corroding substances, wild animals, weapons of all kinds, etc.; and the childs enters a phase in which it directs every instrument of its sadism to the one purpose of destroying its mother's body and what is contained in it.[2]

But that this is compatible with what I have called the thesis of the dependence of the bad upon the good emerges when we consider what the theory tells us are the objects of the child's sadism or that which it is directed upon. Originally turned against the ego, in which form it is properly identified as the death-instinct, when deflected outwards infantile aggression, or envy as it came to be thought of, flows along one or other of two reasonably distinct channels, both of which can be said to be, in the first instance, laid down by the good or the libidinal. So, if, for instance, it is directed against the breast, a typical infantile target, then it is so either because, though the breast once had the power to satisfy the infant's desires, it seemingly no longer can, or because it possesses an unlimited flow of riches but it

[1] Richard Wollheim, *F. H. Bradley* (London, 1959).
[2] *The Writings of Melanie Klein*, vol. i, p. 253.

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keeps this for its own, or another's (say, the father's) gratification. 'Envy spoils the primal good object' is the relevant formula.[1]

But, mere misunderstandings to one side, I want to say something very general about the place of the thesis of the dependence of the bad upon the good in our moral thinking, and, in doing so, I shall concentrate for the moment on its most significant constituent—the ultimate unity of the good—and then say this: that, whatever initial implausibility it may possess, some such belief as this, taken very roughly and therefore in need of much refinement, is a prerequisite of a certain form of naturalism to which both our thinkers subscribe and which, I am inclined to think, is not only the one form in which naturalism is acceptable but the form in which it is correct. Indeed, I would think that one might profitably use the tenability or otherwise of this form of naturalism as a sort of test for the thesis.

The form of naturalism to which I refer has nothing to do with the analysis of the moral judgement, which in this century is the locus where naturalism has characteristically set itself up. The naturalism I have in mind concerns the origins of morals, and its claim is that, in so far as the distinction that we ordinarily draw between what is good and what is bad is licit—and already we can see that this kind of naturalism leads to a critical or revisionary ethical theory—this distinction derives from the way in which our earliest feelings, desires, and wishes represent themselves to us. For they represent themselves to us from the beginning as—and here, of course, our vocabulary will be necessarily inadequate—either favourable, comforting, benign, or as unfavourable, harsh, divisive. Take our desires, for instance: these do not present themselves to us, their owners, as simply being what they are for, and all—innocently, one might say—begging for satisfaction as vociferously as their strength determines. On the contrary, some are acceptable, familiar to us, whereas others stand apart from us, for all their force and fury. Now it seems to me a requirement of the view that morality presupposes some more primitive way in which our endowed propensities are experienced favourably or unfavourably, that those of our propensities that we do experience in a favourable light should be on the whole those which are, and are held to be, reconcilable. In this connection, however, it is surely a genuine gain in realism that in the elaboration of such a naturalism

[1] Ibid., vol. iii, p. 186.

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Kleinian theory adds to the materials with which Bradley's moral psychology makes do the experience of depressive anxiety or guilt and the desire to restore, or create anew, an internal harmony.

It is, moreover, only in the context of this naturalism that I can explain an omission in this lecture, which is deliberate. For I have ignored a topic on which Bradley has little to say but Mrs. Klein has a very great deal to say. And the topic is heteronomy, or the mental phenomenon whereby precepts are given to the agent internally but as if from another, where, in other words, the commander from whose mouth they issue is phantasized peripherally; and the reason for the omission is that it seems totally in keeping with the thought of Bradley, and the view is quite explicit in Mrs. Klein, that such forms of internal regulation, extremely effective though they may be, do not necessarily contribute to our sense of the distinction between good and bad, in so far as this is licit. It is largely due to the misunderstanding of certain remarks of Freud's that it has come to be thought that the conception of the super-ego—a term not so far heard this evening—has a systematic connection with the development of morality. The term 'super-ego' has a not uncomplicated history in Mrs. Klein's theory, as her editors have recently made clear, but it was a constant theme in her thinking that the injunctions or fulminations of internal figures not lying at the core of the ego, play at the best an unreliable, at the worst a deleterious, role in the moral life.

VII

This is all that can be said about the moral psychology of British Idealism and the English School of Psychoanalysis in the time available. I conclude with some observations about the worth of saying it.

My proximate motive in setting what Kleinian theory has to say about the development of the self by the side of the Bradleian account was to make the point that in doing all that he thought he could do for his ethical theory Bradley was appealing to what must be regarded as psychology. The case that he presents for the theory of self-realization rests heavily on substantive issues concerning the mind. But, of course, I would not have thought to subject you to what you have heard this evening unless I had felt that the Bradleio-Kleinian form of inquiry is somehow on the right lines, nor would I have been quite unapologetic in imposing it on you under the heading of a lecture

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in the history of philosophy, had I not also felt that the example of moral philosophy pursued as a branch of psychology is one to be taken very seriously indeed. But why do I feel this?

Suppose we start, as (and I use both senses of the phrase) the better part of twentieth-century moral philosophy has done, from the other end of the line: with the view that moral philosophy has nothing to do with substantive issues and is essentially involved with the analysis of the moral judgement. Sooner or later such a view encounters this difficulty: that it is possible to devise a judgement that satisfies the analysis, and yet is clearly unacceptable as a moral judgement because, say, its content is too trivial, alternatively the only reasons that anyone could have for holding it true would be arbitrary, perverse, inhuman, or some such. And so the original view of moral philosophy might give way to another, broader view on which its subject-matter is not just the analysis, but, more comprehensively, the nature, of the moral judgement: where the nature of a judgement comprehends the general implicatures of the judgement, and also, perhaps, the characteristic speech-acts directed upon it. But difficulties are not at an end: for however deep an understanding moral philosophy might gain of the nature of the moral judgement, the question of its peculiar authority, of what it can stir up in us, cannot be fully answered within the limits that the present view of the subject imposes. Even if we know everything about what constrains the moral judgement, we shall still not know what about it constrains us. Another way of putting the point would be that the so-called autonomy of the moral judgement, which an 'internalist' account of morality is supposed to grasp, can be grasped only if the account assumes an agent to whom it has first attributed, under the guise of rationality, all the requisite moral attitudes, sentiments, and anxieties.

Now this last consideration suggests a fairly considerable shift in our view of moral philosophy, and in the direction of psychology: so that on the revised view its task is, amongst other things no doubt, to exhibit those beliefs, desires, and related attitudes, which would indeed make moral action—from the agent's point of view, that is—rational. But this view too runs into several difficulties. In the first place, a great deal about morality will remain unsaid if we fix our attention entirely on what moves the agent to moral action: we surely need to attend to what he experiences if he desists from moral action, and also to what there is to morality that also moves him to resist moral action. Secondly, if we concentrate on what moves the agent to

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moral action, a great deal about morality will have been presupposed: for many of the beliefs, desires, and other attitudes invoked to rationalize moral action will be themselves, in some broad or even narrow sense, the products of morality. Thirdly, and more obscurely, the rationalization of moral action must involve reference—as, indeed, must the rationalization of all action to some degree or other—not only to the beliefs, desires, and attitudes of the agent, but also to how he stands to them, and in particular to how he stands to the desires: to whether (to recycle that phrase) he does or does not identify with them.

And this third difficulty specifically suggests yet another view of moral philosophy, which would permit it not only to take account of the first two difficulties but also to evade a further objection that might have occurred to you: the objection that this last view robs moral philosophy of the universality and conceptual character that we look for in philosophical inquiry. And the new view would be that the central task of moral philosophy—for, again, there will be other tasks—is to explore the nature or structure of that process whereby our propensities, supremely our desires, are modified or selected, our attitudes to them are developed, so that we are then capable of being appropriately moved to moral action.

Such a view of moral philosophy is, of course, precisely designed to meet the third objection against the last view: the objection, that is, that the view does not take account of how we stand to what rationalizes our actions, and specifically of how we stand to our desires. But in meeting this objection the new view also goes some way towards meeting the first two objections. Unlike its predecessor it can take full account of the ambiguities and ramifications of moral action, and it does not have to presuppose morality in the account it gives. It can do all this just because it brings into the centre of attention not a synchronic slice of the agent's mind but a diachronic process in which his mind evolves. Thus it retains moral philosophy within psychology, but relocates it. However, if it retains moral philosophy within psychology, it also reinstates it as a conceptual inquiry. For one way of viewing the psychological process under exploration is as that process which provides the appropriate conditions for the application of the concept or concepts of morality, and indeed moral philosophy is concerned with the process only in so far as it does lead to this outcome. In this respect it seems to me that moral philosophy is in a very similar position to that occupied by the philosophy of the self, whose

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topic of inquiry is also a process. It may indeed be that it is with one and the same process that the two branches of philosophy are concerned, the difference being that the process is viewed in the two cases with different interests in mind. Such a conclusion is fairly close to the approach of our two thinkers this evening. But, however that may be, in the case both of moral philosophy and of the philosophy of the self, the depth to which philosophical inquiry must cut into the process itself, or how far it should engage with substantive issues, will depend on the estimate one makes of how implicated the sense of the relevant concepts is in the empirical theory under which the process falls.

I end on a question: Is it ironical, or is it by some happier coincidence, that, if one takes the most austerely anti-psychological ethical theory of our day, the imperativist theory, the point at which it seems to come closest to our moral intuitions—that is, where it makes reference to the self-addressed command—is precisely where it conforms to an important truth of moral psychology and one which has been considerably exposed this evening: that morality begins only where the interior dialogue breaks out, a dialogue which on the Bradleian account engages just the good self and the bad self, and which in Kleinian theory pulls in the more numerous and ethically more ambiguous figures of the inner world?

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